The Evolution of Japan’s Foreign Policy

Abstract: 

This paper examines the effect of World War II and its aftermath on foreign policy in Japan. Defeat by the United States, followed by demilitarization and the occupation of country after the war had a profound effect on the Japanese attitudes toward military institutions that was embodied in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. In the 21st century the Japanese are considering a change in the existing policy in order to participate more fully in United Nations peace-keeping missions and gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 

Table of Contents: 

    Introduction

    The dramatic end to World War II altered Japanese society profoundly. The cultural and infrastructural damage combined with the U.S. occupation and continued dominance created norms that have been the base of Japan’s foreign policy. However, several events have distorted the actors and environment of the international system, thus necessitating an evolution to an interest-based foreign policy.

    The norms produced by World War II were largely embodied in the Japanese Constitution and represented the population’s extremely wary view of military institutions. Specifically, Article 9 articulated this perspective and became a norm that, although being challenged today, is extremely difficult to abolish. After its humiliating defeat and demilitarization, Japan rebounded quickly and flourished economically largely due to the U.S.–Japan Security Alliance. This allowed Japan’s focus to shift from the military to energy security, international trade, and technology. Therefore, the main policy goals in post-World War II Japan were to regain economic prosperity and avoid foreign policy conflicts or anything that would digress from that goal.

    The international arena has undergone several changes that required Japan to adjust its foreign policy, and the events and factors shaping this transformation are multifaceted. Acceptance into the United Nations, the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, September 11th, and the War in Iraq have resulted in new, sometimes unconventional international actors as well as a drastically different security environment. Japan has reacted by slowly evolving its foreign policy while remaining sensitive to its cultural and economic norms. The factors driving this evolution also vary: U.S. policy, foreign threats, Koizumi’s leadership, and domestic issues all have played important roles in the shift to a Japanese foreign policy based on national interest.

    Japan’s Foreign Policy Goals in the Twenty-First Century

    Japan’s foreign policy goals are framed through an international lens to promote its national interest and are a reflection of its goal to reestablish itself as a great global power. Japan has been seeking a permanent seat on the UN Security Council since the end of the Cold War, and it is seeking to expand its global role through global security maintenance and increased participation in UN international peacekeeping operations.

    Japan’s defense policies are also intertwined with foreign policy. It aims to support UN activities by promoting international cooperation to achieve world peace, and it seeks to establish the foundations for national security by maintaining international security. Japan’s regional goals include peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, and more urgently, a peaceful resolution of North Korean issues. It is seeking to develop a cooperative relationship with China by peacefully resolving Taiwan issues and improving the transparency of China’s military affairs.1

    Japan’s foreign policy goals, which are global in scope, mirror foreign policy of the United States. Promotion of fundamental values (like democracy), reduction and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the prevention and eradication of terrorism all align with U.S. post-9/11 foreign policy.2

    More generally, Japan also wants to improve the effectiveness of the UN and increase its own role in conflict resolution. Japan also believes that peace and prosperity can be achieved by strengthening economic ties; thus, it is seeking to promote free-trade agreements, invest Asia’s money into regional economic development, and facilitate labor movements.3 This is also a reflection of national interest as Japan is facing an aging population and shortages in the labor force. With the expansion of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the increasing scope of its operations, Japan has had to defend its position by reassuring other nations that its policies are purely defense-oriented and that it has no desire to reassert itself as a military power or military threat to other countries.4 Japan’s establishment and expansion of the SDF are most representative of Japan’s new foreign policy goals and the departure from a foreign policy regulated by norms to interest-based policies.

    Norms-based Foreign Policy: Its Constraints and Evolution

    The foundation of post-World War II norms lie in Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution and the atmosphere created by the U.S.–Japan Security Alliance. Article 9 renounces Japan’s right to war as well as the use or threat of force to resolve disputes. It also states that a military will never be maintained and Japan will never act belligerently toward other nations.5 This expression of pacifism reflects not only the 1945 defeat and skepticism of the military, but was further ingrained as the futility of military power was displayed by the United States in the Vietnam War. Military strength was seen to lead to its direct use and invasion of other countries.6 Peaceful sentiment remained a powerful norm because of the security umbrella provided by the alliance with the United States: Japan simply never had to worry about its protection. Japan’s focus was on its financial strength, technological growth, and integration into the world economy.

    Despite the explicit ban on all forces and other “war potential,” Japan passed the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Act of 1954. Article 9 was interpreted to mean that Japan retained the right to defend itself and had the right to maintain forces necessary to do so.7 However, public skepticism of any military institution required numerous constraints on the SDF, which made it almost impossible for the forces to be deployed. As a peaceful nation, Japan did not want to be involved in any situation that involved the use or threat of force. Immediately after the law passed, the House of Councillors passed another resolution that prohibited the SDF from being sent abroad. Even though Japan took the first step away from its constitution by creating the SDF, the missions and objectives of the SDF were severely restricted by social norms.

    Japan’s acceptance into the United Nations introduced new expectations that laid the groundwork for a reformation of foreign policy and slow reemergence into the global system. Although Japan joined the United Nations in 1956, it did not take part in its first peacekeeping effort until the 1990s; pacifism proved to be a firmly held norm and placed multiple obstacles in the way of Japanese involvement. Japan claimed its foreign policies were centered on the United Nations, but when the United Nations requested ten officers to be dispatched to a peacekeeping operation in the United Arabic Republic and Lebanon in 1958, Japan could not live up to global expectations or fulfill its own promises.8 The failure and embarrassment involved in rejecting a formal UN request highlighted contradictions between the UN charter and their own constitution, and it led to the formulation of the UN Resolutions Cooperation Bill. This bill called for full participation in economic sanctions and permitted SDF contributions to the UN.9 This caused great debate within the Diet (Japanese parliament), and received an even larger public backlash. Participation in economic sanctions would go against Japan’s main goal of fully integrating into the global economy, and deploying the SDF was forbidden. Japan also did not want to join operations that involved sending the SDF abroad and could potentially be misinterpreted at home or abroad. Economic and cultural norms ultimately prevented the passage of the UN Resolutions Cooperation Bill.

    Japan slowly started reconsidering its role in the United Nations and in peacekeeping operations with the changing atmosphere of the Cold War. The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and a new Soviet Pacific fleet created a new security environment. The result was a new list of contributions that Japan could make to the UN drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, taking into consideration Article 9. Funds and materials, election supervision, medical assistance, transportation and communication activities, police activities, logistical support, and observation activities were all permitted under the strict pretense that no armed force would be used.10 The security environment and Cold War atmosphere altered public opinion in a way that demanded greater Japanese involvement. Japan already provided more money to the UN than any country other than the United States, and the shift in public opinion allowed Japan to finally establish a more visible presence worldwide. The International Cooperation Initiative in 1988 listed five areas Japan could increase its role in: active pursuit of diplomatic efforts, more contributions to UN-sponsored activities, involvement in conflict resolution, refugee assistance, and increased aid and involvement in reconstruction.11 Unfortunately, this did not prove to be enough for the international community in the Gulf War.

    The Gulf War is a catalyst in the evolution of Japanese foreign policy. The consequences of the Gulf War included new laws, relaxed regulations, and new interpretations of the existing legal framework. The United States pressured Japan to provide logistical support to troops, but deploying the SDF would have been a direct violation of Article 9. There was a clear risk for the SDF to get caught in the conflict and use military force; thus, the Japanese refused to deploy the SDF and received harsh criticism from the United States and world at large. A New York Times ad from Kuwait thanked every country except Japan, even though it had covered 20 percent of the war costs. This extreme embarrassment directly led to a reassessment of Japan’s role in the world and demonstrated that Japan could no longer be passive in international security.12 What was also shocking was the fact that Japan had failed to provide support in an area that directly affected its national interests. Eighty-eight percent of Japan’s oil came from the Middle East, and the legal framework that prevented SDF involvement greatly risked Japan’s energy needs.13 A direct effect of this experience was the Peacekeeping Law passed in 1992. This law finally allowed the SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, but still restricted its involvement. The SDF was only allowed to participate if there was an established cease-fire, consent from the host country, and the UN was impartial to the different parties. Furthermore, once the operation was initiated, SDF personnel could use weapons only in self-defense or the defense of other SDF personnel.14 Japanese forces could not protect non-Japanese citizens nor be asked to use weapons, but the opportunity to engage in force still existed. This particular condition is a deviation, albeit a small one, from Article 9 and a reinterpretation of the word force to allow the use of arms. The final condition stated that all peacekeeping operations must be suspended if any of the previous conditions were broken. The goal was to reduce the chance for using weapons and restrict participation in any potential combat zones.

    As Japan became more involved in peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, many of the elements of the Peacekeeping Law were increasingly ignored. Cambodia is the best example of an operation that clearly went against social norms and violated many aspects of the Peacekeeping Law. Cambodia was also highly controversial because it was the first deployment of the SDF. Originally, all of the preconditions for participation were met. Japan was to take charge of noncombat duties in a cease-fire atmosphere. However, despite the declared cease-fire, the factions were still fighting. Two deaths incited anger in Japan as many people assumed that UN operations were, by nature, nonviolent. The SDF was also assigned an explicit security role in guarding polling areas, and the forces were almost recalled.15 The government made a difficult decision against public opinion in order to preserve its global reputation at a very decisive time: withdrawing from its first peacekeeping operation would have been detrimental.

    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made several attempts to enhance Japan’s reputation by increasing its role in the world. Incremental but vital progress was made after the Gulf War humiliation, when Japan reformulated its policy to allow it to participate physically in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Throughout the 1990s, Japan participated in five major operations including Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, El Salvador, and East Timor.16 The consequences were relaxed regulations, reinterpretations of constitutional language, and greater freedom to participate in UN operations. Japan’s slow adjustment to the changing international environment prepared it to enter a new century of policy transformation.

    A New Era of Foreign Policy: September 11th

    Japan’s foreign policy in the twenty-first century has witnessed a clear departure from norms-based foreign policy to an interest-based foreign policy as exhibited by several events. September 11th is the defining moment in Japanese foreign policy, and it ushered in the new age of unconventional threats and warfare. U.S. policy, Prime Minister Koizumi, foreign threats, and internal factors all had an enormous influence over the Japanese response to September 11th and its foreign policy thereafter.

    U.S. policy shaped Japan’s response and participation in the War on Terror. Fighting Al-Qaeda required Japan to demonstrate alliance loyalty, which had been extremely damaged by the Gulf War. Japan feared losing the credibility and benefits of the bilateral relationship; hence, Japan realized it had to share the physical risks as well as the financial burdens to strengthen the alliance.17 The United States communicated that it expected visible support and did not want another Gulf War situation, but it left the specifics of support to be decided by Japan. By leaving Japan with ambiguous expectations, the United States left Japan with more responsibility and received much more support and involvement than it anticipated.18

    Prime Minister Koizumi greatly shaped Japan’s initial response to September 11th and took great risks in doing so. Prior to September 11th, Koizumi’s foreign policy goals included expanding Japan’s global security role and strengthening the U.S.–Japan alliance.19 The terror attacks provided him the perfect opportunity to achieve both at once. Within hours, he had already contacted Washington and communicated his willingness to join the anti-terror coalition. On September 12th, Koizumi publicly stated Japan would join the United States to combat terrorism. On September 14th, Japan declared its support would include everything but combat.20 Moreover, Koizumi took great risks to enhance Japan’s military and political reputation, achieve more equality in the U.S. –Japan Security Alliance, and, therefore, advance Japan’s national interest. Koizumi circumvented foreign policy, making procedures to offer rapid assistance. On September 19th he released his Seven-Point Assistance Package, which was to be the basis of the anti-terrorism legislation.21 The great risk in this decision, beyond the fact that he had not consulted the Diet, was that he alone could not assure or fulfill his pledge. However, domestically promising concrete forms of aid allowed him to define it on his own terms. As Japan was pursuing a more equal relationship with the United States and was seeking to distance itself from U.S. dominance, this step was vital. Koizumi’s powerful leadership is also exemplified through the Anti-Terrorism Bill, which became law in less than three weeks. Koizumi strategically used the 1954 Defense Agency Establishment Law to send SDF just in time for the first crucial phase of Afghanistan.22 Despite all of Koizumi’s efforts, Japan did not follow through with all of its promises. The SDF remained at a distance from any potential problem zones and the medical aid was never provided.

    The prospect of foreign threats played a small but significant role in Japan’s decision to combat global terrorism. Koizumi emphasized terrorism as threatening people everywhere and the peace and security of all countries.23 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed Al-Qaeda was a direct threat because it was operating through international terror cells and endangering Japanese citizens abroad. Throughout the 1990s, several terrorist attacks affected Japanese nationals abroad. In 1996 the Japanese Ambassador’s residence was seized by terrorists; in 1997 the terror attacks in Luxor, Egypt, claimed the lives of several Japanese tourists; and in 1999, in the Kyrgyz Republic, several Japanese citizens were kidnapped by the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan.24 The link between terror groups and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to unstable regimes such as North Korea also threatened Japan’s security.

    Internal factors also played an important role in Japan’s response to September 11th. Public opinion backed military support for the United States, and 48 percent approved SDF involvement. Eighty-one percent of people felt that a terrorist attack as large as the one in the United States could happen in Japan.25 In addition, Japan felt more compelled to aid the United States and join the War on Terror because of its own experiences with internal terror groups. In 1995, a religious cult named Aum Shinrikyo released sarin nerve gas in a Tokyo subway system during rush hour. It was the most serious terrorist event in recent history and resulted in twelve deaths and five thousand injuries.26

    September 11th set several precedents and was a blatant departure from Japan’s original norms-based foreign policy, but some norms remained evident. The dispatchment of the SDF to the Indian Ocean would not have been allowed by previous norms. In the past, deployment of the SDF was strictly for peacekeeping and disaster-relief efforts, but in Operation Enduring Freedom, Japan provided rear support for U.S. forces outside of the region. September 11th also set a precedent by equalizing economic and military goals. The SDF has a new purpose of counterterrorism and can now use small arms in self-defense. Although Koizumi argued that terrorism was a threat to Japan, the Diet disagreed and became concerned with the economic costs. Supporting the United States was seen to threaten its neutrality with Arab nations and to threaten Japan’s national interest by endangering its oil supply.

    War in Iraq

    The War in Iraq was another opportunity for Japan to increase its policy objectives of maintaining global security and strengthening the U.S.–Japan alliance. U.S. policy, foreign threats, and Koizumi’s leadership again played an important role in the development of policy and actions Japan took.

    The U.S.–Japan alliance played a role in the decisions and policies of Japan. The United States conveyed its desire for Japan to assume a larger leadership role in international politics and take on more responsibilities in ensuring peace and stability. The recently established precedent set by Japan’s response to September 11th heightened U.S. expectations for Japan’s involvement in postwar reconstruction in Iraq. The United States used the same political strategy it used after September 11th: it gave ambiguous expectations involving a political endorsement of the United States and studying contributions Japan could make to the U.S. military and postwar reconstruction.27 In essence, the United States believed that Japan would fulfill its alliance obligations as it had before. The growing threat from North Korea also pushed Japan to meet and exceed U.S. expectations; Japan believed it could deter North Korea by maintaining a strong relationship with the United States. Japan’s main worry was that North Korea would perceive a weak alliance and become even more aggressive in threatening Japan’s security. Therefore, the U.S. security guarantee and extended deterrence relied on a contribution to Iraq.

    Foreign threats influenced Japanese foreign policy following the U.S. invasion of Iraq with North Korea a constant theme. Japan’s main concern with Saddam Hussein was the perceived weapons of mass destruction (WMS) program. Japan could not risk the proliferation of WMD to unstable regions or a dangerous dictator such as Kim Jong Il. The fact that Saddam Hussein would not comply with UN resolutions further convinced Japan that Iraq had something to hide. The main motive for supporting the invasion was deterrence: Iraq’s defiance could have encouraged proliferation and allowed North Korea to continue its WMD program without worry. The Middle East was also seen as a foreign threat because of its potential impact on national interests such as energy and security. Stability, oil, and terrorism were specifically linked to justify the deployment of peacekeepers and reconstruction assistance.28

    Koizumi directed Japan’s foreign policy as he continued to take great risks to strengthen the U.S. alliance, increase Japan’s security, and advance its national interest. Koizumi bypassed bureaucratic procedure to determine the outline of Japan’s Iraq policy, and he had many obstacles to overcome in order to pass an Iraqi reconstruction bill and legally deploy the SDF. The fact that Iraq was an occupation zone, the operation was not UN sanctioned, there was no host country consent, and the safety of SDF personnel would clearly be endangered made Koizumi’s goals extremely challenging. Both the constitution and the Peacekeeping Law were disregarded and the Iraq bill was passed in less than two months under the premise of UN Security Council Resolutions 678, 687, 1441, and 1483.29 Postwar reconstruction also offered the opportunity Koizumi, and Japan, had been seeking: normalization. Sending the SDF to participate served that function perfectly. Koizumi linked sending the forces to Japan’s obligations as a member of the international community and a great power.

    Japanese involvement in the War in Iraq is a continued digression and the largest shift regarding foreign policy, Article 9, the Peacekeeping Law, and all prior legal framework detailing SDF objectives and conditions for deployment. Japan’s involvement in Iraq violated two precedents. It participated in reconstruction efforts that were not mandated by the UN and aided the United States in an operation considered illegitimate by most of the world. Iraq was considered a de facto combat zone, which entailed a greater risk for casualties. A majority of the public opposed the Iraq War and the troop contributions, but Koizumi has been able to retain a high amount of support despite making policy against public opinion.

    Contemporary Threats and Development of Foreign Policy: North Korea

    The Korean Peninsula is one of the most imminent threats to regional security and stability. Japan’s foreign policy goals include the reunification of North and South Korea in addition to reconciliation. If North and South tensions decrease, a North Korean attack on Japan will become less likely. Japan and North Korea have an unpleasant relationship that has gotten increasingly worse with recent developments including North Korea’s nuclear program, kidnappings, terrorist attacks, spying operations, and arms proliferation.

    North Korea’s nuclear program is a top priority for Japan as well as the United States. On August 31, 1998, Korea fired the Taepo-Dong 1 ballistic missile over Japan and ignited a new fear of an attack.30 With Japan officially in range of North Korea, Japan had to adjust its defense policies again to ensure the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. With the Taepo-Dong 1 and No-Dong missiles’ ability to reach Japan in six minutes,31 Japan decided to revise the clause prohibiting collective security in order to work with the United States on a ballistic missile defense system. Previously, the collective security article would not have allowed Japan to share technology or information with another country, let alone develop a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system together. Collective security also prohibits Japanese involvement when it is not a primary target, and the BMD capability is meant to intercept attacks on the United States and Japan. Careful political maneuvering has been needed to quell any constitutional concerns; attacks meant for U.S. targets that are on Japanese islands are still considered an attack on Japan.32

    U.S. policy did play a small role as Washington had been pressuring Japan to participate in research and develop for BMD. Until the threat from North Korea, Japan had not seen any motivation; thus, the Taepo-Dong flyover was a catalyst for BMD development. Koizumi also had surprisingly little to do with BMD. It kept a relatively low profile and was largely noncontroversial because of the perceived foreign threat. The Japanese Defense Agency was most responsible for its initiation.33

    Contemporary Threats and Development of Foreign Policy: China

    China is Japan’s other major concern. The conflict with Taiwan is one of the most intimidating challenges to regional stability. Taiwan is Japan’s second largest export market, and because of the U.S.–Japan alliance and the United States’ proclaimed support of Taiwan, China is afraid that one of the aims of the alliance is to separate Taiwan from China. China is also wary of Japan because of its imperialistic history with China and colonial history with Taiwan. Regarding Taiwan, Japan’s goals are to deter cross-strait conflict, avoid provoking China, and preserve Taiwan’s free-market economy. However, a long-term goal does involve preventing a positive Taiwan–China unification because of the increasing potential for a hostile China.34 The security of Taiwan is also important to Japan because of the large number of Japanese nationals who are there at any time. If the situation were to escalate, Japan would not be able to militarily support Taiwan or enforce any of its promises.

    Japan also has acute, short-term security issues with China. Both countries are involved in a territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands, and Japan believes that China has trespassed into its Exclusive Economic Zone more than fifty times.35 Other issues such as environmental degradation are causing acid rain in Tokyo and sending dust across the sea.36

    China is arguably the most difficult challenge for Japanese foreign policy. China does not trust Japan because of its failure and incapability to take responsibility and apologize for its past imperialistic behavior, and it is offended by political visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Because of its past history with Japan, China also does not want to be controlled by an economically powerful and technologically advanced historical imperialistic power.37 Likewise, China is developing rapidly, has nuclear weapons, is a permanent UN Security Council member, and is becoming a regional and global power. Its defense budget has doubled from $10 million to more than $50 million in the past decade. China also has new fighter planes, arms production facilities, and Russian missiles and submarines.38 China and Japan could be drawn into conflict over any of the aforementioned issues, and the military and political links between China and Russia are equally dangerous for Japan. Japan also has a tense relationship with Russia over the disputed Kurile Islands (or Northern Territories).

    Conclusion: What Lies Ahead

    Japan is undergoing a foreign policy transformation. It is digressing from its normative constraints and focusing on promoting its national interest. However, because some social norms do persist, Japan has to frame its foreign policy and security goals through an international lens. Cultural norms predict limiting the size of the defense budget, inhibiting SDF deployment overseas, preventing the amendment of Article 9, and inhibiting the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The first two predictions were incorrect, and the last two are to be determined. Additionally, the U.S.–Japan Security Alliance will remain influential in shaping the future of Japan.

    One of the remaining challenges and questions is the constitutional debate with Article 9. It has been made largely irrelevant with constant reinterpretations and disregard throughout its history. The establishment of the SDF, the Peacekeeping Law, the response to September 11th, Japan’s involvement in Iraq’s postwar reconstruction and the War on Terror, and BMD development all conflict with Japan’s constitution; therefore, the only real or true significance in reforming Article 9 will be in the departure from a strongly held social norm of pacifism. In addition, 60 percent of the public favor changing the constitution while 90 percent of Diet members approve a reformation.39 The only remaining debates are how the wording in Article 9 will change or if Article 9 will remain a part of the constitution.

    The U.S.–Japan Security Alliance will remain extremely important to both countries.It guarantees and enhances Japan’s security through extended nuclear deterrence, protection of Japan’s sea-lanes, and adds credibility to Japan’s claims. The United States is also an important moderator in resolving disputes outside and within the alliance.40 However, Japan is no longer sitting under a reliable U.S. security umbrella and is faced with many threats. Defending itself may necessitate preemption, which is completely against Article 9. With an unstable and insecure regional environment, Japan may be able to use self-defense as its justification for launching a preemptive strike.

    Many people have questioned Japan’s nuclear intentions. Japan does have a successful nuclear cycle and the technological ability to easily create nuclear weapons. It also has the necessary delivery systems due to BMD and the expansion of its military. However, norms are still likely to play a huge role in the nuclear debate. As a peaceful country, Japan still strongly advocates its Three Non-Nuclear Principles: nonpossession, nonproduction, and nonintroduction of nuclear weapons to Japan.41

    Japan’s foreign policy has seen a slow evolution, and national interest is now a priority in its foreign policies and goals. As Japan continues to grow economically and play a greater global role, many political and social norms may place constraints on the military. History has proven the futility of war, and the Japanese people still strongly advocate pacifism. With such a large economy, many people may also ask the question, “Why attack if we can just buy it?” Also, policies that could possibly negatively impact the economy will still be highly debated as Japan’s foreign policy has always included a focus on its economy. Finally, domestic public opinion will continue to shape politicians’ decisions. Although it has been ignored in the past, the increasingly pluralistic system will make it much harder for public opinion to be overstepped.

    The SDF are most representative of Japan’s changing priorities, policy goals, and overall evolution. Japan originally established and expanded its military under the pretenses of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping has advanced into global security maintenance and has the potential to continue developing toward a normalization of the military and its objectives. The overall evolution of Japan’s foreign policy has been the shifting focus from social norms to national interest.

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    Endnotes

    1. Japan Ministry of Defense, “The Basics of Japan’s Defense Policy,” 2007, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/pdf/english.pdf> (accessed December 12, 2007).
    2. Ibid.
    3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “MOFA: United Nations Reform: Priority Issues for Japan.” January 2006.
    4. Japan Ministry of Defense. “The Basic’s,” 2007.
    5. House of Councillors, The Constitution of Japan, The National Diet of Japan, 2001, http://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/law/index.htm (accessed December 12, 2007).
    6. Reinhard Drifte. Japan’s Foreign Policy for the 21st Century (New York: MacMillan P LTD, 1998), 26.
    7. William Heinrich and Akiho Shibata. United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations, 50.
    8. Ibid., 10.
    9. Ibid., 13.
    10. Ibid., 16.
    11. Ibid., 18.
    12. Ibid., 19–20.
    13. Daniel Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World. (Westport: Praeger, 2006), 120.
    14. Heinrich and Shibata, 61–63.
    15. Ibid., 25.
    16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan’s Role in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security,” 2004, 5 (accessed December 12, 2007).
    17. Kliman, 12.
    18. Ibid., 74–75.
    19. Ibid., 77.
    20. Ibid., 77.
    21. Ibid., 82.
    22. Ibid., 84.
    23. Ibid., 69.
    24. National Police Agency, “The International Terrorism Situation.” The Oncoming Threat of Terrorism, 2005.
    25. Kliman, 9.
    26. Council on Foreign Relations, “Aum Shinrikyo,” Nov. 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9238/ (accessed December 12, 2007).
    27. Kliman, 125.
    28. Ibid., 120.
    29. Ibid., 133–134.
    30. Nonna Chernyakova. “N. Korea Fires Rocket Over Japan,” Vladivostock News, 1998.
    31. Ted Osius. The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 12.
    32. Kliman, 107.
    33. Ibid., 108.
    34. Osius, 22.
    35. Drifte, 53–54.
    36. Osius, 37.
    37. Hanns Hilpert. Japan and China: Cooperation, Competition, and Conflict. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 33.
    38. Drifte, 53–54.
    39. Osius, 67.
    40. Drifte, 68–69.
    41. Japan Ministry of Defense, The Basics, 2007.