Globalization and Indigenous Group Violence in Latin America


This paper investigates the relationship between levels of globalization and indigenous conflict in Latin America. I hypothesize that higher levels of globalization lead indigenous movements to engage in violence. This is because globalization threatens the indigenous community due to the spread of "market capitalism,” the introduction of western values and cultural threat, and increases in social communication. These relationships are tested using data from 415 indigenous groups across 15 Latin American countries (using data from the Minorities at Risk- MAR- data base). I employ an ordinal logistic regression model that evaluates the effect of globalization, controlling for the size of the indigenous population, military capacity of the state, group concentration, economic discrimination experienced by the group, average district magnitude (a measure of the electoral system), and whether or not the political system is federal. The findings suggest that higher levels of globalization are not related to indigenous conflict. Rather, higher levels of globalization significantly reduce the propensity for violence. Further the extent to which the political system is “inclusive” via a more proportional electoral system and federalism significantly reduces the propensity for political violence.

Table of Contents: 


    Indigenous peoples of Latin America have existed for centuries. In recent years, interest in the plight of indigenous peoples has increased, as has the interest in why some have engaged in organized political activity and others have not.

    Generally indigenous peoples are “conquered descendents of earlier inhabitants of a region who lie mainly in conformity with traditional social, economic, and cultural customs that are sharply distinct from those of dominant groups” (Minorities at Risk, 2009). Indigenous groups in Latin America are particularly marginalized. Studies from the World Bank have also noted that indigenous peoples are, on average, much poorer and less educated, and have less access to health care than other groups, and the gap between majority populations and indigenous groups has increased over time. Much of this is the legacy of colonialism and neo-colonialism. As Ortiz (2007) argues, the approach adopted by the Latin American state was to “de-Indianize” the indigenous population via seizure of lands, forced removals and relocation, eradication of language, and institutional racism (p. 89).

    At the same time, there has been an increase in the political mobilization of indigenous peoples. In recent years, indigenous movements have increased and become more active. Lucero (2008) states, that “throughout the Americas…indigenous people have challenged the national political and economic projects that in centuries past rarely took them into account” (p.2).  Although much of this began as a protest against poor living conditions, these movements have evolved into struggles for identity. Lucero (2008) states that indigenous peoples seek to retain their identity and resist integration with mestizaje (people of mixed heritage with European race and culture). He claims that “moving from stigma to strength, indigenous organizations have rearticulated indigenous and campesino identities, and mobilized in unprecedented numbers against neo-colonial racial orders and neo-liberal elites” (p.3). Alvarez, Dagnio, and Escobar (1998) also note that these movements not only seek to redress economic grievances but also seek to, “re-signify the very meaning of received notion of citizenship” (p. 2). However, as Gillette Hall (2005) points out, even though indigenous peoples have been able to increase their political activities, it has not helped them reduce the poverty they face.

    The activities of these indigenous movements have also varied from country to country.  As Yashar (1998) notes, indigenous political movements have emerged in some countries in Latin America (such as Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Mexico) but not in others (such as Peru and Chile). In addition, some of these groups have become violent, whereas others have not. What accounts for these differences?

    The Emergence of Violent Indigenous Groups

    The existing literature recognizes several factors that generally account for the emergence of violent movements. On one hand, there is the psychological deprivation-frustration- aggression approach (Gurr, 1968). Gurr argues that frustration derived from a sense of deprivation is a key to the emergence of aggressive and violent behavior. Poverty stricken indigenous groups thus should be prime candidates to engage in violence but clearly not all of them do. This is because the deprivation must also be a product of social change. Gurr (1973) also argues that social change is one of the main factors that produce revolution and finds that “violent conflict and revolutionary movement occur in times of change” (p. 363). In particular, rapid social change that challenges people’s traditional values, norms, and socio-economic circumstances causes a more intense sense of deprivation and hence magnifies frustration and aggression. Thus in countries where there are significant and rapid changes in the environment, resources, and technology, there should be greater pressures for indigenous groups to engage in violence.

    A second approach, related to the resource mobilization approach advocated by Charles Tilly (1975) suggests that groups that are highly organized are more likely to engage in violence than groups that are not. Indeed, Yashar (1998) notes that part of the reason for the emergence of indigenous political movements was the skillful use of causes by political entrepreneurs to mobilize people (such as advocating liberation theology or revolutionary ideologies). Yashar (1998) argues that previous organizational networks (such as churches) have helped indigenous movements mobilize, so in countries where there are such organizational resources, we are more likely to see the emergence of an indigenous political movement as well as a violent group.

    Still others note that violence can be forestalled by political inclusion. Based upon the work of Arend Lijphart and others, scholars such Johanna Birnir (2007) and Kanchan Chandra (2003) have argued that inclusion of ethnic group members in the political process, and the representation of their interests in that process, effectively buys off potential dissidents (Cleary 2000). Therefore, institutional arrangements that promote the greater representation of indigenous populations should impact both the likelihood that such groups emerge in the first place, and whether these movements become violent. From this point of view, exclusion of groups from the political process is more likely to result in violent responses (in part a product of political frustration).

    Globalization and Indigenous Movements

    Although there has been a growing interest in the impact of the international environment on indigenous politics, most of this work has focused on the role of international organizations in promoting human rights. In many ways, greater access to indigenous peoples by international NGOs has helped in the mobilization of indigenous groups (Jackson & Warren, 2005).

    Nonetheless, there has been little scholarly work on the general relationship between globalization and its relationship to the behavior of indigenous movements. One exception is the work of Yashar (2007) who argues, using a limited set of case studies, that globalization is not one of the primary causes for the rise of indigenous movements. She argues, instead, that globalization can frame the issues and affect what groups do, but it does not explain the emergence of politicized movements. She contends, however, that although globalization cannot explain the rise of indigenous movements, it can explain a state’s social change, such as modifying restrictions on free markets, reinforcing international alliances, and confronting actors that pressure states to reform their relationship with its citizens (Yashar, 2007). In other words, it can be the catalyst for violent collective action.

    To further understand how globalization affects indigenous movements, scholars have examined the relationship between globalization and ethnic movements. Ishiyama (2004) points to the literature that suggests globalization is directly linked to the emergence of violent ethnic conflict. This is because globalization has negative economic consequences for indigenous populations (such as growing competition for jobs in a global market) and cultural threat (foreign ideas and practices threatening traditional values). Indeed, many scholars believe that, “increased conflicts can only be understood as resulting from a backlash against globalization encroachment on identity…[and] globalization forces a materialistic and superficially universalistic set of Western values on the rest of the world, and this elicits a violent reaction” (Ishiyama, 2005, p. 3).   After testing this empirically, he found that there is no direct relationship between globalization and ethnic conflict—however globalization is related to the levels of protest among minority groups (Ishiyama, 2004).

    Scholars of Latin American politics, using case study research, have also argued that globalization has encouraged violence (Johnston & Laxer, 2003). Johnston (2000) examines the Zapatista movement and concluded that globalization was the main factor that caused them to rebel against the government. The rise of globalization in Mexico created numerous neo-liberal policies that went against the indigenous communities. As a result, indigenous people not only felt betrayed by their own country, but they were threatened by the economic pressures and cultural threat brought by foreign investment and communication. Further, without a voice to air their grievances, given the corrupt and authoritarian nature of local southern Mexican politics, the movement opted for violent actions.

    Cleary (2000) and Radcliffe (2007) also argue that neo-liberal economic policies that have accompanied economic globalization have had strikingly negative impacts on the indigenous peoples of Latin America. Radcliffe (2007) states that the rise of globalization has resulted,

    …in privatization of assets and resources…[as a result] in the current neoliberal and geopolitical context, according to one businessman, ethnic mobilization could jeopardize the exploitation of natural resources—gas, oil, gold…in territories with a significant indigenous population…Latin America neoliberalism works against a politics of redistribution by exacerbating inequality and pushing indigenous peoples into poverty. Privatization of land markets, combined with the emphasis on individual responsibility, has compounded indigenous loss of voice…Neoliberalism’s support for entrepreneurialism pushes Indians into market-oriented production and restrictive forms of political participation. Large numbers of Indians remain impoverished under neoliberalism, trapped by segregated labor markets, limited product outlets, insecure land tenure, and weak social welfare. (p. 390)

    Similarly, Hristov (2009) suggests that globalization creates greater “grievances” among indigenous peoples. He argues that globalization provides greater mobility for indigenous peoples to move to the cities. However, once indigenous peoples search for jobs in cities because they cannot find jobs elsewhere, they are tormented by city people. Hate is directed against indigenous peoples who are seen as an economic threat to majority groups, thus raising the probability of violence between indigenous peoples and the economically and politically dominant group.

    According to a number of scholars, globalization in Latin American countries has negatively impacted the indigenous community because it contributed to further marginalization of minority groups. High levels of globalization shift the government’s attention toward an international agenda away from domestic issues. Some of the signs of high levels of globalization according to Lucero (2008) are “massive layoffs in the public sectors…[introduction to] dollarization of the economy, privatized state industries, and eliminate[ing] subsidies on electricity, gasoline, and domestically used natural gas” (p. 12).  High levels of globalization (with neo-liberalism) establish policies that take away many things from the indigenous community, such as their lands and identity. Yashar (2007) examined indigenous movements over time and argued that globalization encourages indigenous groups to mobilize more because globalization had threatened

    …to disrupt local property regimes in ways that challenged indigenous autonomy, [engaged in] transcommunity networks (built by churches, unions, and NGOs) provided the organizational capacity enabling indigenous leaders to mobilize across disparate communities, including those separated by geographic distance, and language. (p. 9)

    Such threats can potentially lead indigenous peoples to believe that there is no hope for them if they engage in non-violent movements. As a result, they move away from non-violent movements to engaging in conflict.

    Although many scholars suggest that globalization has caused a negative impact on the lives of indigenous peoples (raising their grievances against the existing political and economic system) Yashar (1998, 2007) suggests that globalization also provides indigenous peoples with the ability to organize. In particular, globalization creates “transcommunity” networks which she defines as “churches, unions and NGOs.” She argues that transcommunity networks have assisted the mobilization of groups because it has offered opportunities for communication and coordination between individuals in groups that did not exist before (Yashar 1998, 2007). Yashar (2007) also suggest that transcommunity networks allowed indigenous movements to bypass boundaries that they could not bypass before.

    For all the above reasons, high levels of globalization have increased the likelihood of indigenous movements becoming violent, because they generate international organizations that have negative effects on indigenous populations. There should, therefore, be a direct link between high levels of globalization in Latin American countries and violent indigenous movements.

    My theory holds that the likelihood for indigenous movements to become violent depends on the level of globalization. This suggests the following hypothesis: If levels of globalization are high, then indigenous violence is more likely to occur.

    Research Design and Methodology

    From the above reasons, I test the relationship between levels of globalization and indigenous conflict in Latin America. The dependent variable is the extent to which an indigenous movement has engaged in organized action or violence. For the purpose of this paper the unit of analysis is indigenous groups as identified by the Minority at Risk (MAR) data base for Latin America. There were 415 cases (from 15 countries) included in the sample.

    The dataset used is from the Minorities at Risk database, which includes all the indigenous peoples of Latin America. In addition, I used data on levels of globalization from the KOF index of globalization which measures levels of globalization across all countries. I use only Latin American countries that were listed by the MAR as having indigenous peoples. The list of indigenous peoples and countries is provided in Table 1.

    The dependent variable for this study is the estimated level of mobilization and violence engaged in by an indigenous group from 1991 to 2007.The measure was derived from the Minority at Risk (MAR) database. The dependent variable “movement” is measured using the risk assessment and analytic summary from the MAR data set. I use this instead of the MAR variable of conflict, because the MAR variable lumps all indigenous groups together by country. Since I am interested in individual indigenous groups I coded each individual indigenous group separately based upon the detailed description in the risk assessment and analytical summary. The section includes, “whether the group is at risk of rebellion, protest, or repression, based on levels of a number of other variables,” and the analytic summary includes, “brief history of the group and its relations with the state” (Minorities at Risk, 2009). Movements scores were coded from 0 to 2 where:

    0= No Movement Reported; 1= Non-violent Movements 
Protests, political organization activities, and acts of symbolic resistance (e.g., starvation, blockage of traffic, and/or sit-ins).

    2= Violent Movements
actions including person(s) hurt at a rally, strikes, and/or riots.

    The primary independent variable “globalization”’ is defined by Clark (2000), Norris (2000), and Keohane and Nye (2000), to be “the process of creating networks of connections among actors at multi-continental distances, mediated through a variety of flows including people, information and ideas, capital and goods” (KOF, 2010, para. 1). Globalization, however, has also been defined in other ways including economic globalization which is based on a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which includes “foreign direct investment flows (FDI), which manages a country’s interest; Foreign Direct Investment stock (sums the FDI stocks); and Portfolio Investment (sums portfolio investment stocks and portfolio investment liabilities stocks). [There is also the political part of globalization which includes] embassies in country, membership in international organizations, absolute number of international inter-governmental organizations, participation in U.N Security Council missions per capita, and international United Nations treaties” (KOF, 2010).

    In addition, Evans (1997), Cox (1996), and McMichael (1996) classify “globalization” as an ideology and argue that it is “associated with neoliberalism…to economic development and reform” (Guillen, 2001, p.236). Ishiyama (2004) contends that globalization permits one country to take control of a weaker country. Baker, Epstein, and Pollin (1998) argue that globalization has had a negative effect on the “nation-states,” and has increased in privatization (Ishiyama, 2004). As a result, globalization has had negative consequences on Latin American countries.

    A good measure of the various aspects of “globalization” is the 2010 KOF index of globalization. I use the KOF index because, unlike others, such as the AT Kearney/Foreign Policy Index (ATK/FP), it includes more countries (123) across more years (Dreher, Gaston & Martens, 2008). KOF includes several aspects of globalization, such as:

    1. Economic globalization, characterized as long distance flows of goods, capital, and services, as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchange;

    2. Political globalization, characterized by a diffusion of government policies; and

    3. Social globalization, expressed as the spread of ideas, information, images, and people. (KOF, n.d., para. 2)

    Thus, for the purpose of this paper I use globalization as my primary independent variable. I use the KOF index of globalization to measure the levels of globalization from 15 Latin American countries. The measure ranges from 1 to 100 where 100 is the maximum value and 1 the lowest value, so the higher the level of globalization, the more globalized a country is. For this paper, I use the years 1991 to 2007, since 1991 is the first year of the KOF index and because it is the first year following the end of the Cold War. In addition, I include several control variables such as the percentage of the population made up of indigenous people in each country, the military capacity of the state, group concentration, economic discrimination, and the institutional configurations of the political system.

    In addition to levels of globalization, other variables have been added, such as indigenous group concentration and economic discrimination. Group concentration is important because the difference between whether an indigenous group was concentrated in one specific area or dispersed among different places can have an impact on their mobilization. When members of a group live in close proximity to one another, it is easier to coordinate group action. Group concentration (GROUPCON) is included for each country in the dataset, and is scored from 0 to 3 where:

    GROUPCON Group Concentration Index

    0 = Widely dispersed

    1 = Primarily urban or minority in one region

= Majority in one region, others dispersed

    3 = Concentrated in one region

    Economic discrimination (ECDIS) also used as a control variable. As we noted above, economic grievances and poverty are  key elements in promoting social action and violence. Economic discrimination measures economic discrimination against indigenous groups. The measurement index for economic discrimination also measures from 0 to 4. The value 0 means there are no types of economic discrimination against indigenous groups and the value 4 means that there is the highest level of economic discrimination.

    ECDIS Economic discrimination index

    0= No discrimination

    1= Neglect/remedial policies

    Significant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group’s material well-being.

    2= Neglect/no remedial policies

    Significant poverty and under-representation due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aimed at improving the group’s material well-being.

    3= Social exclusion/neutral policy

    Significant poverty and under-representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination.

    4= Exclusion/repressive policy

    Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group’s economic opportunities by contrast with other groups.

    In addition, I added military expenditures from the dataset Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. This is because it is quite conceivable that the strength of the state (especially in terms of military power) serves as a deterrent to indigenous groups acting against the state. I used the SIPRI military expenditure database and measured expenditures as the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) from 1991 to 2007 for each country.

    In addition to the above control variable, I also added the Average District Magnitude for each country. The average district magnitude measures the extent to which an electoral system is more or less proportional, with values ranging from “1″ (or single member plurality) to infinity (as the system becomes more proportional). Generally, as Lijphart (1999) and others have argued, the electoral system, specifically the openness of the electoral system, may deter violent action.

    Lastly, I incorporate a measure of federalism by country. The Global Networks on Federalism dataset includes 24 countries out of 193 countries that have federal political systems and, out of all the Latin American countries, only Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela have a federal political system. Therefore, the measurement includes 0 if the country does not have a federal political system and 1 if the country has a federal political system.


    Table 2 reports the results of the ordinal logit procedure, where the dependent variable is the extent to which an indigenous movement has engaged in organized action or violence, alongside the independent variables. The logit procedure showed that there were 395 cases that were observed and the results are shown below.

    As shown in Table 2, most of the variables were statistically significant—however, concentration and economic discrimination were not. Despite being statistically significant, the negative sign indicates that the relationship is the opposite of what I hypothesized. In other words, globalization does not raise the likelihood of indigenous violence, but has exactly the opposite effect. Globalization tends to decrease the likelihood of indigenous violence. Perhaps it is because globalization provides economic opportunities to indigenous peoples that are incentives not to engage in violence. Or perhaps globalization through transcommunity networks helps indigenous peoples so it is not necessary to engage in violence. Rather, international organizations help indigenous peoples by giving them resources such as education, in order for them to engage in politics. Therefore, indigenous peoples are more likely not only to mobilize more effectively (as the results of globalization), but as Van Cott (2007) argues, “Indigenous political parties…attract media attention by offering compelling images and appeals that resonate with a broader population…The old view that the poor cannot effectively compete in Latin America politics is no longer valid” (p. 134).

    Importantly, the variables that measure the extent to which there are openings in the political system (or the extent to which indigenous groups have opportunities to articulate their interests) are statistically significant. In particular, if countries have a federal political system then the likelihood of mobilization and violence decrease. Similarly, if there is high average district magnitude (as a measure of the “openness” of the electoral system) in countries, then the likelihood of indigenous violence will decrease. These findings support the literature that suggests that political structural variables are more important than international economic factors in explaining the mobilization and violence of identity groups, such as ethnic groups (see Ishiyama, 2004).

    As indicated by the results in Table 2, the variable military capacity of each group suggests that if a country has high levels of military capacity, then the likelihood for indigenous groups to engage in violence decreases. Thus, the coercive power of the state appears to deter the mobilization and violence of indigenous groups.

    Also, in Table 2, the variable “percentage of indigenous peoples in each country” indicates that if Latin American countries have a large number of indigenous groups, then the likelihood for indigenous peoples to engage in violence decreases.


    The above results illustrate that, contrary to the claim made by many scholars, globalization is not related to indigenous group violence in Latin America. In fact, globalization significantly reduces the propensity for political violence. This may be because the economic opportunities created by globalization may diffuse efforts at mobilization and violence. However, more research must be conducted in order to discern why globalization seems to reduce the level of indigenous group violence.

    Interestingly, the results demonstrated that as more countries had federal political system or larger district magnitudes, the less likely indigenous groups were to engage in violence. This suggests that in countries where indigenous groups have greater potential political opportunities (such as gaining a greater voice in systems) the less likely indigenous groups are to engage in violence. Also, the results showed that countries with a large indigenous population are less likely to see indigenous conflict, which  makes sense—indigenous groups that are larger are more likely to have political “clout” and hence are less likely to engage in violence. In addition, the results showed that the more military capacity the country had, the less likely indigenous groups are to engage in violence. This is perhaps because states that have larger military capacities are better able to intimidate indigenous groups and prevent an escalation to violence.

    In sum, the literature did not support the primary hypothesis, although the political institutional variables were related to the dependent variable.  This suggests that perhaps the best hedge against violence is political inclusion and representation. Whatever the case, further research needs to be conducted in order to discern whether or not federalism and more proportional electoral systems actually lead to greater indigenous group political representation. This provides a promising avenue for future research.


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    Table 1: List of indigenous groups and countries included in the analysis

    Group Country
    Collas Argentina
    Chiriguanos Argentina
    Tehuelche Argentina
    Tobas Argentina
    Tincu Nacu Argentina
    Mapudungun Argentina
    Mocovi Argentina
    Mbya Argentina
    Guaranies Argentina
    Wichi Argentina
    Mataco Argentina
    Mapuches Argentina
    Selk’namgon Argentina
    Ayoreo Bolivia
    Carancho Bolivia
    Yawanawa Bolivia
    Toba people Bolivia
    Uros Bolivia
    Wichí people Bolivia
    Tsimané Bolivia
    Guató people Bolivia
    Bororo people Bolivia
    Oaqachacan Highland Bolivia
    Aymara Speaking Indians Highland Bolivia
    Quechua Speaking Indians Highland Bolivia
    Uru Highland Bolivia
    Chipaya Languange Highland Bolivia
    Callahuaya Highland Bolivia
    Tarabucos Highland Bolivia
    Chayantas Highland Bolivia
    Laimes Highland Bolivia
    Ucumaris Highland Bolivia
    Calchas Highland Bolivia
    Chaquies Highland Bolivia
    Yuras Lipes Highland Bolivia
    Tirinas Highland Bolivia
    Guarani Lowland Bolivia
    Arawaks Lowland Bolivia
    Chiriguanos Lowland Bolivia
    Moxos Indians Lowland Bolivia
    Chiquitanos Lowland Bolivia
    Panoan Lowland Bolivia
    Tacanan Lowland Bolivia
    Moxoan Lowland Bolivia
    Kaiwa Brazil
    Kaingang Brazil
    Kaimbla Brazil
    Guajajara Brazil
    Guarani Brazil
    Aché Brazil
    Amanyé Brazil
    Awá Brazil
    Baniwa Brazil
    Botocudo Brazil
    Caingang Brazil
    Dowlut Brazil
    Enawene Nawe Brazil
    Guaraní Brazil
    Kamayurá (Kamaiurá) Brazil
    Karajá Brazil
    Kayapo Brazil
    Kubeo Brazil
    Kalias Brazil
    Korubo Brazil
    Marinahas Brazil
    Matsés Brazil
    Mayoruna Brazil
    Munduruku Brazil
    Nambikwara Brazil
    Ofayé Brazil
    Panará Brazil
    Pirahã Brazil
    Quilombolo Brazil
    Suruí Brazil
    Tapirape Brazil
    Terena Brazil
    Ticuna Brazil
    Tremembé Brazil
    Tupi Brazil
    Tupiniquim (Tupinikim) Brazil
    Waorani Brazil
    Xavante Brazil
    Xokó Brazil
    Xucuru Brazil
    Yanomami Brazil
    Yawanawa Brazil
    Zuruaha Brazil
    Zemborya Brazil
    Mapuche Chile
    Pehuenche Chile
    Huilliche Chile
    Alberto Achacaz Walakial Chile
    Alacaluf Chile
    Atacameño Chile
    Aymara ethnic group Chile
    Capayán Chile
    Chango people Chile
    Chono Chile
    Cuncos Chile
    Diaguita Chile
    Fuegians Chile
    Gualemo Chile
    Huaca de Chena Chile
    Indian auxiliaries Chile
    Mapochoes Chile
    Moluche Chile
    Patagon Chile
    Picunche Chile
    Poya (tribe) Chile
    Promaucaes Chile
    Quechuas Chile
    Rapanui Chile
    Selknam people Chile
    Tehuelche people Chile
    Yaghan Chile
    Yanaconas Chile
    Arhuaco Highland Colombia
    Awá Highland Colombia
    Coconuco Highland Colombia
    Guambiano/Misak Highland Colombia
    Guanes Highland Colombia
    Inga Highland Colombia
    Kamsa (Sibundoy) Highland Colombia
    Kankuamo Highland Colombia
    Kogui/Kaggaba Highland Colombia
    Mokana Highland Colombia
    Muisca Highland Colombia
    Paez/Nasa Highland Colombia
    Pacabuy Highland Colombia
    Pastos Highland Colombia
    Pijao Highland Colombia
    sutagaos Highland Colombia
    Tama Highland Colombia
    Totoro Highland Colombia
    Umbra Highland Colombia
    U’wa/Tunebo Highland Colombia
    Wiwa/Sanha Highland Colombia
    Yanacona Highland Colombia
    Achagua Lowland Colombia
    Amorua Lowland Colombia
    Andaqui Lowland Colombia
    Andoque Lowland Colombia
    Bara Lowland Colombia
    Barasana Lowland Colombia
    Bari/Motilon Lowland Colombia
    Betoye Lowland Colombia
    Bora Lowland Colombia
    Cabiyari Lowland Colombia
    Carapana Lowland Colombia
    Carijona Lowland Colombia
    Cocama/Kokama Lowland Colombia
    Cofan/Kofan Lowland Colombia
    Coreguaje Lowland Colombia
    Cubeo Lowland Colombia
    Cuiba Lowland Colombia
    Curripaco Lowland Colombia
    Chimila Lowland Colombia
    Chiricoa Lowland Colombia
    Desano Lowland Colombia
    Embera Lowland Colombia
    Guahibo People (Sikuani) Lowland Colombia
    Guayabero Lowland Colombia
    Kuna/Tule Lowland Colombia
    Kokama Lowland Colombia
    Hupda Lowland Colombia
    Letuama Lowland Colombia
    Makaguaje Lowland Colombia
    Makuna Lowland Colombia
    Masiguare Lowland Colombia
    Matapi Lowland Colombia
    Mirana Lowland Colombia
    Muinane Lowland Colombia
    Nonuya Lowland Colombia
    Nukak Lowland Colombia
    Ocaina Lowland Colombia
    Piratapuyo Lowland Colombia
    Pitsanira Lowland Colombia
    Puinave Lowland Colombia
    Saliba Lowland Colombia
    Siona Lowland Colombia
    Siriano Lowland Colombia
    Taiwano Lowland Colombia
    Tanimuka Lowland Colombia
    Tariano Lowland Colombia
    Tatuyo Lowland Colombia
    Tukano Lowland Colombia
    Tuyuca Lowland Colombia
    Wounaan Lowland Colombia
    Wanano Lowland Colombia
    Wayuu Lowland Colombia
    Witoto/Huitoto/Uitoto Lowland Colombia
    Yagua Lowland Colombia
    Yukana Lowland Colombia
    Yukpa/Yuko Lowland Colombia
    Yuri (People) Lowland Colombia
    Yuruti Lowland Colombia
    Zenu Lowland Colombia
    Chimborazo Highland Ecuador
    Tagaeri Highland Ecuador
    Otavalos Highland Ecuador
    Colorados Highland Ecuador
    Cayapas Highland Ecuador
    Aushiris Lowland Ecuador
    Achuar Lowland Ecuador
    Woaroni Lowland Ecuador
    Cofanes Lowland Ecuador
    Quichuas Lowland Ecuador
    Secoyas Lowland Ecuador
    Sionas Lowland Ecuador
    Shuaras Lowland Ecuador
    Tetetes Lowland Ecuador
    Zaparos Lowland Ecuador
    Epera Ecuador
    Chachi Ecuador
    Huaorani Ecuador
    Sioa Ecuador
    Tsachila Ecuador
    Canari Ecuador
    Cayambi Ecuador
    Caranqui Ecuador
    Chibuleo Ecuador
    Puruha Ecuador
    Salasaca Ecuador
    Nahua-Pipiles El Salvador
    Lencas El Salvador
    Cacaoperas El Salvador
    Quiché Guatemala
    Maya Guatemala
    Alta Verapaz Guatemala
    Sololá Guatemala
    Totonicapán Guatemala
    Quetzaltenango Guatemala
    Huehuetengago Guatemala
    Achi’ Guatemala
    Akateka Guatemala
    Awakateka Guatemala
    Pokoman Guatemala
    Ch’orti’ Guatemala
    Chalchiteka Guatemala
    Chuj Guatemala
    Garifuna Guatemala
    Itza’ Guatemala
    Ixil El Guatemala
    Jakalteka Guatemala
    K’iche’ Guatemala
    Kaqchikel Guatemala
    Mam Guatemala
    Mopan Guatemala
    Poqomam Guatemala
    Poqomchi’ Guatemala
    Q’eqchi’ Guatemala
    Q’anjob’al Guatemala
    Sakapulteka Guatemala
    Sipakapense Guatemala
    Tektiteka Guatemala
    Tz’utujil Guatemala
    Uspanteka Guatemala
    Xinka Santa Guatemala
    Miskito Honduras
    Paya Honduras
    Sumu Honduras
    Lenca Honduras
    Chorti Honduras
    Chorotega Honduras
    Pipil Honduras
    The Tol (Jicaque) Honduras
    Maya Honduras
    Tawanka Honduras
    Garifuna Honduras
    Xicaques Honduras
    Torrupan Honduras
    Juchitecos Mexico
    Maya Mexico
    Tzeltal Mexico
    Tzotzil Mexico
    Chol Mexico
    Tojolabal Mexico
    Zoque Mexico
    Lacandón Mexico
    Nahuas Mexico
    Mixtecos Mexico
    Otomis Mexico
    Otonacos Mexico
    Mazatecos Mexico
    Mazahua Mexico
    Tarascos Mexico
    Huicholes Mexico
    Coras Mexico
    Tepehuanes Mexico
    Cuicatecos Mexico
    Huaves Mexico
    Chatinos Mexico
    Triquies Mexico
    Amuzgos Mexico
    Papagos Mexico
    Pimas Mexico
    Huastecos Mexico
    Seris Mexico
    Tarahuamaras Mexico
    Popolucas Mexico
    Chinantecos Mexico
    Yaquis Mexico
    Zapotecs Mexico
    Chocho Mexico
    Cocopa Mexico
    Guarijio Mexico
    Kikapú Mexico
    Paipai Mexico
    Tephuán Mexico
    Chontal de Oaxaca Mexico
    Chichimeca Jonaz Mexico
    Ch’ol Mexico
    Chontal Maya Mexico
    Chochimi Mexico
    Ixcatec Mexico
    Kiliwa Mexico
    Kumeyaay Mexico
    Matlatzinca Mexico
    Mayo Mexico
    Mexicanero Mexico
    Mixe Mexico
    Nahua Mexico
    Pame Mexico
    Pima Bajo Mexico
    Popoloca Mexico
    P’urhépecha Mexico
    Tlapanec Mexico
    Totonacos Mexico
    Trique Mexico
    Yucatec Maya Mexico
    Miskito Nicaragua
    Sumu Nicaragua
    Rama Nicaragua
    Chorotega Nicaragua
    Guaymi Panama
    Kuna Panama
    Choco Panama
    Bugle Panama
    Bokota Panama
    Terraba Panama
    Bribri Panama
    Mascoi Paraguay
    Mataco Paraguay
    Zamuco Paraguay
    Guarani Paraguay
    Guaykuru Paraguay
    Ayoreo Paraguay
    Enxet Paraguay
    Tupi Paraguay
    Aché Paraguay
    Chané People Paraguay
    Mbayá People Paraguay
    Sanapana Paraguay
    Toba people Paraguay
    Achuar Peru
    Shipibo Peru
    Aguaruna Peru
    Ashaninka Peru
    Amuesha Peru
    Piro Peru
    Machiguenga Peru
    Bora Peru
    Chayanuita Peru
    Cocama-Cocamilla Peru
    Jivaroan Peru
    Matis Peru
    Matsés Peru
    Secoya Peru
    Ticuna Peru
    Tupi Peru
    Urarina Peru
    yora Peru
    Aymara Peru
    Amahuaca Peru
    Cofán/Kofan Peru
    Korubo Peru
    Mayoruna Peru
    Muinane Peru
    Ocaína Peru
    Quechua Peru
    Tukano Peru
    Witoto/Huitoto Peru
    Yagua Peru
    Mashco-piros Peru
    Yaminahuas Peru
    Yukuna Peru
    Inca Peru
    Wayuú Venezuela
    Warao Venezuela
    Pemón Venezuela
    Aňu Venezuela
    Yaņomanö Venezuela
    Joti Venezuela
    Yukpa Venezuela
    Bari Venezuela
    Karanakae Venezuela
    Saimadoyi Venezuela
    Ano Venezuela
    Yucpa Indians Venezuela
    Karina Venezuela
    Akawaio Venezuela
    Arawako Venezuela
    Ye’kwana Venezuela
    Piaroa Venezuela
    Auaké Venezuela
    Baniwa People Venezuela
    Guahibo People Venezuela
    Huya Venezuela
    Ingarikó Venezuela
    Mariche Venezuela
    Motilone Bari Venezuela
    Saladoid Venezuela
    Sanumá Venezuela
    Ye’kuana Venezuela

    Table 2: Coefficient Estimates: What Explains Indigenous Mobilization and Violence National

      Logit Model with dependent variable  whether indigenous movement has engaged in organized action or violence (Standard Errors)
    Average Globalization -.063** (.019)
    Percent of Indigenous  Peoples in Each Country -.016*** (.008)
    Military Capacity of Country -.472** (.210)
    Indigenous Group Concentration .259  (.140)
    Economic Discrimination -.300  (.197)
    Federal Political System -.993* (.472)
    Average District Magnitude -.088** (.033)
      N=395  Pseudo R²=0.04

    *       P<.05
    **      P<.01
    ***    P<.001
    Cases (n=395)