Popular Resistance, Leadership Attitudes, and Turkish Accession to the European Union

Abstract: 

The longstanding E.U. members have continuously found ways to delay a positive decision on Turkey’s membership. Although various reasons have been offered across time, it is undeniable that Turkey is perceived as culturally different by the public as well as political decision makers in the E.U. To what degree does this perception influence decision making regarding Turkey’s entry into the E.U.? I investigate this question through two strategies; first, I will assess the benefits and costs of Turkey’s admission to the E.U. This assessment will include economic and political issues that would affect the E.U. Second, I will examine public opinion regarding European nationalism and Turkey using data from the Eurobarometer public opinion surveys for France and Germany. Are attitudes in favor of Turkey’s accession from people who are less nationalistic? Are people who are nationalistic and strongly value the European identity more likely to be against the accession?

Table of Contents: 

    Introduction

    The European Union’s method of enlargement is primarily based on criteria that must be met by each joining member. Such criteria include a stable democracy that respects human rights, a sustaining market economy, and acceptance of membership obligations as well as abiding by E.U. law. There are many different approaches to explain the drive behind the enlargement (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). The main theoretical arguments regarding enlargement are classified as supply side arguments (Mattli & Plumper 2005). Many of today’s theories focus on the E.U. motives for wanting new countries to join.

    These theories light the trail to discovering why the E.U. accepts one country over another. One theory which perceives the expansion as a temporal process is the historical-institutional approach. This approach says that once E.U. actors “make an initial commitment to an aspiring country, this commitment sets in motion temporal forces” which lead to the creation of financial, legal and institutional ties between the aspiring country and the E.U. (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). These are the forces that define the range of outcomes as to when the aspiring country will be included in E.U. affairs. More recently there has been use of synchronic approaches to understand E.U. enlargement. With this “theoretical turn” in enlargement studies, Schimmelfennig (2001) developed three major approaches: the rationalists, sociological, and synthetic. The sociological and rationalist approaches emphasize the “role of cost-benefit calculations and ideational factors” (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 9) while the synthetic view focuses on rhetorical action (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Nugent, 2004). With these approaches, I will try to answer the question, “On what grounds do E.U. members reject or accept an aspiring country?”

    The sociological approach affirms that the E.U. enlargement “is largely shaped by social identities, norms and values” (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 6). If an aspiring country holds “collective identities and norms embodying in European integration” then the E.U. will grant membership (Schimmelfennig, 2001, p. 5). According to researchers, (Schimmelfennig 2001) general cultural values, moral responsibility, strong possession of liberal democratic values, and kinships are all necessary factors in granting accession. These factors are important to the accession of a country because they help “shape actors’ identities and interests” which will in turn shape the outcome of accession talks. The actors must accept the collection of ideational and cultural factors that the country holds, in order for there to be a consensus in favor of that country. The sociological theory calls these factors a “community” or “cultural match,” which must be shared between the applicant and the members. The general hypothesis regarding member-state and applicant politics is “the more an external state identifies with the international community that the organization represents… the more it shares the values and norms that define the purpose and the policies of the organization” the more eager the states are in pursuing the state (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 10). Thus, with regard to the E.U., if they find an applicant to be “‘European,’” [then they] subscribe to the integrationist project of an ‘ever closer union,’… or [if they] share the norms underlying the specific E.U. policies,” then accession will occur (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 8).

    The rationalist theory takes a different approach. This theory suggests that E.U. actors determine membership based on “cost-benefit calculations” (Caymar, 2009). States desire “the kind and degree of horizontal institutionalization” that will ultimately capitalize their net benefits (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 14). Paul Taylor believes that “the costs of enlargement greatly exceed the benefits” (Taylor, 1996, p. 139). Conversely, Alan Mayhew states “enlargement is a win-win situation: all parties will gain in general” (Mayhew, 1998, p. 199). These two views represent the varying effects a new member can have on the E.U.

    In determining these calculations, one usually begins with the costs. Primarily, there are the monetary costs which the E.U. will have to manage. What effects will the new member’s market economy have on existing member states? Will this new country need financial assistance once it is accepted? If their poverty level is high, will it disrupt the well-being of the wealthy states? These questions and more are calculated by looking at GPD per capita, productivity, capitalization, savings, and economic output. If the outcome of such calculations result in the new state being less developed than the existing states, they must manage the “development gap” (Dardanelli, 1999). Should they then allow for long transition periods to create market segmentation or will they simply “impose harmonization?” (Dardanelli, 1999). Secondly, they must determine potential effects of the country’s cultural and socio-economic heterogeneity (Bideleux & Jefferies, 1998). More heterogeneity in the Union would equal an increase in internal transaction costs (Dardanelli, 1999). For some, this increase results in a decrease in efficient policy making. Lastly, costs involving security and stability will be questioned. Will a new country’s external problems become internal once accepted? Concerns over a country’s external conflicts are huge, as the E.U. will be obligated to intercede, thus taking on additional stress that otherwise would have been avoided if not for a new member.

    While Taylor’s view of enlargement equals a loss for the E.U., Mayhew finds benefits to be weighed in simply looking at the costs from a different angle. In doing so, he finds the potential heterogeneity cost to have advantages. The differences can foster competition, innovation and tolerance while, to an extent, enlarging representation (Dardanelli, 1999). The cultural differences in new states can strengthen efforts to see diversity in a positive light that will decrease conflict between diverse groups. The accession of a state could mean trade to new markets. The addition of new, bigger markets could not only facilitate economic growth for the European Union but to all of Europe. Lastly, the E.U. may reap the benefits of the new state’s foreign relations. They may decide the new state could assist in forming positive relations with foreign nations whom that country may be on better terms with than current members.

    This paper investigates the degree to which Turkey’s cultural and religious diversity partly contributes to its delay of joining the European Union. I will first determine the prerequisites necessary to be admitted into the European Union and the changes Turkey has taken in order to fit entry requirements. Then, I will use the combination of rationalist, sociological and synthetic approaches to formulate a strong foundation on which doubt can be based for the equity of the political battle Turkey faces in entering the European Union. By applying these theories of how the European Union allows countries to join to the case study of Turkey, I will be able to reveal prejudice that perpetuates their position of candidacy. My hypothesis is that there is a tacit quality—either cultural or religious—keeping Turkey from being admitted into the European Union. I will support my hypothesis by providing evidence relative to each individual theory. First, I will use the logic of the rationalist theory, to assess the costs and benefits of Turkey’s accession, in order to see if there are incentives for the E.U. By providing evidence of economic benefits presented with data tables of economic contribution to the E.U. and statistics on the market, we will see whether or not the admission of Turkey would be advantageous or detrimental to the E.U. Dually, I will raise the argument for the costs, which includes increased immigration of Turks to E.U. member countries. Using the theory of the sociological approach, I will determine if there is a perceived cultural difference between Turkey and the rest of Europe. This perception will be accessed through a wide-variety of European political polls.

    Although each approach may present different fundamental factors for the basis upon which the E.U. accept members, the primary determinant is the discretion of individuals who make those decisions. Ultimately, their words and actions dealing with the aspiring country affect their ability to accede.  While E.U. actors manipulate one another to pursue their interests using rhetorical action to win arguments, Turkey sits alone, inflamed by the unjust treatment it faces. With too many “costs” stacked against them and a bold culture that is not considered part of the “European identity,” how will they gain access to such a guarded group?

    E.U. Enlargement

    In May of 1950, a speech given by French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, inspired a movement of European countries to pool together coal and steel resources. Six countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherlands) established the European Coal and Steel Community. After World War II, this group wanted to create a market that would promote “internal prosperity and maintain international competitiveness” (Wallace, 2001, p. 2). However, they soon realized nothing could be attained without a strong cooperation on the level of country-to-country. They wanted to end destruction due to war, foster political harmony and reinforce Europe’s security (inspired by a perceived Soviet threat). In this manner the Coal and Steel community transformed into an Economic Community and finally, the region now known as the European Union. Today, The E.U. creates common policies to oversee economic development, promotes social integration and maintains democratic values for all of Europe. At the start of their creation they were only six nations but have now total twenty seven countries. Together these member states make up a strong union whose provisions affect all of Europe.

    In the last decade, the European Union’s enlargement has procured a new wave of research involving the methodology of the expansion. The enlargement has been important for the development of European integration, as well as the creation of Europe’s political and economic order. Because of this expansion, the E.U. has become the focal point of contemporary European affairs (Caymar 2009). While much has been written about why the E.U. enlarges, not much is known as to why some countries receive a free membership, while others are moved to the waiting room. The most well-known and controversial case is Turkey. For years, Turkey has reformed and represented itself, again and again, to make attempts at gaining accession. What is the case the E.U. makes against Turkey’s accession and what are the reforms upon which Turkey has placed its pride?

    Attempts at Accession

    Turkey’s attempt at reaching membership status with the European Union is nothing short of old news. Since 1963, when Turkey signed a European association agreement usually seen as a “prelude to membership,” they have worked harder and harder to gain acceptance. Turkey’s formal application for membership occurred in 1987. This application remained active yet untouched by E.U. officials as they chose to take in eight more countries throughout the 1990s. An E.U.-Turkey customs union was formed in 1996; however, in 1997, during the Luxembourg European Council summit, Turkey was simply acknowledged as wanting candidacy status while actually making enlargement plans with eleven other applicants. This response was a significant offence to Turkey who interpreted this ordering of priorities as a rejection.

    Before the 1997 summit meeting, Turkey was still facing crucial problems in their government. The “soft coup” that cast out the mildly Islamist party caused much instability throughout the country. Turkey’s economy faltered and it showed in their currency exchange rate: one U.S dollar was worth 107,000 Turkish liras. Such major monetary issues led to the big 2001 IMF bailout. In addition, Turkey battled with Kurdish PKK terrorists in the southeast, in which many human rights issues were protested and took militant action against Turkey. Some of these issues may have caused the E.U. to take caution and hold off on declaring Turkey’s candidacy.

    Finally, in 1999 at the Helsinki E.U. summit, Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate. The Helsinki summit was said to have “repaired the damage done in Luxemburg” (Avci, 2003, p. 6). E.U. leaders came to a decision that if Turkey “satisfied their Copenhagen criteria” by December 2004, they would announce a date for accession negotiations (Avci, 2003, p. 6). The criteria ensured states that joined the E.U. would uphold “democracy, the rule of law, human rights; respect for and protection of minorities” with the addition of holding the unsaid idea of European identity (Avci, 2003, p. 6). In addition, before they could join, new members had to bring their legislation and show that it was in line with E.U. legislation. Since E.U. legislation overrides domestic law, they could not have domestic law in the books that violated E.U. provisions. This need for alignment led to many hours of work spent combing through the country’s law to ensure that laws were consistent with E.U. directives. In the investigation of Turkey’s legislation, Turkey realized they needed to establish a functioning market economy to compete and take on obligations of membership of the E.U. Dually, they needed to reform human rights laws, and transition into a liberal-democracy to be considered worthy of the E.U.’s alliance.

    After the talks at the Helsinki summit, Turkey regained hopes of accession and slowly began to change policies and its economy. The first wave of changes came after the conversion of parties with new heads of state. In November of 2002, the Justice and Development party, a “mildly Islamist-leaning party,”, entered office. Their leader, Mr. Erdogan, later became president. One of his pressing goals was to create reforms that would satisfy the Copenhagen criteria and separate government from military. With the financial tumult of 2001 safely behind them, Erdogan built better economic policies. He tightened fiscal policy and took control of inflation. His party was able to repair weaknesses in banks and satisfy past debts. Before accession negotiations with Turkey were opened in 2005, Austria and Cyprus threatened to veto the decision. In seeing “divisions among the member states”, the Negotiating Framework declared accession negotiations as “open-ended” and contained provisions for the suspension of talks. The E.U. predicted the process would take no less than ten years of negotiations, “long transition periods and permanent safeguard clauses.” In addition, France and Austria declared they would hold referendums over Turkey’s accession, which would be the first referendums over enlargement to ever occur in an old member state.

    In October of 2006, a year after E.U. accession negotiations formally opened, a progress report for Turkey announced achievements in spending more on education than defense, creation of legislation to protect the disabled and children, and improvements on health systems and social security. In recent years, the biggest part of their modernization and development plan has been the improvement in the education system. Their focused attempts to exercise better social policy in the areas of human rights and non-governmental organizations have opened new chapters in the acquis—the body of E.U. law—to discuss. Likewise, due to their developed dynamic civil society, citizens are allowed to openly discuss important subjects that were previously taboo.  Regulations on food safety, addressed by the E.U. as a major problem, are currently under reformation. Controls on medicines, road and air transportation safety, and procedures to modernize juvenile justice have also been developed in the object of meeting E.U. standards.

    Despite their success, negotiation talks were halted less than three months after the positive report. Turkey’s refusal to implement a Customs Union with Cyprus gave the E.U. an excuse to delay matters until harbors were opened to Greeks. Chapters were not to be opened or closed until there was a resolution. In January of 2007, the E.U. opened new chapters in the acquis which Turkey was to fulfill. They found positive changes made in the prison system and in the modernization of human rights. Regardless of Turkey’s continual improvements, E.U. commissioners made disappointing statements in which they pointed out that “negotiations with Turkey are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand.” So far there have been twelve out of thirty-five chapters have been effectively opened, while others are under negotiation by Turkish government and Parliament.

    Methods

    First, I will use the basis of the rationalist theory to determine whether or not economics plays a part in the E.U.’s current decision with Turkey. If the issues of economics investigated here result in benefit to the E.U., this finding will create further questions as to why the decision has been so greatly delayed. I will use pre-existing studies from Angsar Belke (2005) and Gordon Platt (2010) that have assessed the economic effects of regional economic integration on Turkey and the E.U. In this portion of the paper I will answer the question: do economic benefits overweigh political costs?

    Primarily, the major asset of Turkish accession would include advanced trade integration. Turkey currently participates in the E.U. internal market for goods permitted by the 1995 customs union agreement (Belke, 2005). Since then, there have been increasing shares of overall exports to GDP and a continuous share of the E.U. in general Turkish trade (Belke, 2005). This account concludes with the customs union between Turkey and the E.U. not leading to trade diversion but trade creation.

    Another potential benefit of gaining Turkey as a member is the acquisition of  undeveloped, modern sectors that could prove to be successful once expanded (Belke, 2005). Turkey is divided into small but efficiently, performing, progressive sectors. These sectors, mainly industry and some service, in the western regions have produced more than some of the new members (Belke, 2005). At the same time, there is the traditional agricultural sector that produces much for Turkish people. This dual economy proves to be successful for Turkey as it increases exports but allows for few imports (Belke, 2005). The industrial sector leads in Turkey’s development process. In the past decade, the reforms have created liberalization movements that enabled growth and increased production levels in this sector. Subsectors of the Turkish industrial sector include electronics, automotive, glass, sugar, and defense. Over the past five years, Turkey has experienced foreign direct investment inflows amounting to $50 billion originating from Europe (Platt, 2010). The other major contributors are the Arab Gulf countries. Ziya Akkurk, CEO of Akbank, says, “Turkey will be a manufacturing industry base for Europe and the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region” (Platt, 2010, p. 41). The industrial sector even promotes agricultural growth in the county because it produces agricultural machinery and fertilizer (Platt, 2010). In terms of agriculture, Turkey is similar to other small, new members, like Poland and Romania, in that a dominant proportion of the work force is employed within this sector. In the past, the agricultural sector has been a huge contributor to GNP (Belke, 2005). Today, there has been a decline in the importance of agriculture and a focus on industry/service. Regardless, this sector allows them to be self-sustaining because the land and climate are suitable for a wide variety of crops, therefore limiting the amount of crops imported. In addition, sectors in retail trade, energy, logistics, and chemicals are recognized as fast growing. Energy has been Turkey’s top direct investment sector in recent years (Platt, 2010). The demand for energy has been rapidly rising and estimates indicate an increase of about 4% in annual growth will occur until 2020, according to Akkurt (Platt, 2010). The Nabucco gas deal underlines Turkey as an important energy corridor which connects the “commodity rich economies of the East” to that of the advanced economies in Europe (Platt, 2010).

    Egemen Bagis, the Turkish minister for E.U. affairs, compared Europe’s economic crisis in recent years with Turkey’s growth of 11 percent in 2010, saying it was “vital,” in terms of European access to regional energy resources (Pierni, 2010). Bagis spoke in reference to Europe’s recent economic decline due to sovereign debts (Pierni, 2010). The accumulation of massive piles of debt has caused many of the politically and economically powerful countries, like the UK, France, and Germany, to dramatically cut government spending or face default. The list of countries suffering excludes Turkey because they had already faced similar turmoil back in 2001 and have corrected the legislative issues in banking and federal spending to ensure future sustainability. The current crisis in Europe does not easily affect Turkey because they had already exercised reformation, a task many of the E.U. members are working on now.

    Currently, the E.U. remains Turkey’s main export market; however it continues to expand markets to gain more opportunities in the MENA region. In 2007, out of all Turkey’s exports, 56% left for the 27 E.U. members (Platt, 2010). Another 17.8% were exports to the MENA region. As Europe shifts out of the recent crisis, Turkey is “cranking up its export machine” (Platt, 2010). In the first quarter of the year, the overall exports rose 22% to $25 billion (Platt, 2010). In addition, the March 2010 total was up more than 34% in comparison with March of 2009 (Platt, 2010).

    The Finansbank demonstrates how Turkey can be seen as an asset and shows the relationship between Turkey’s economy and the European Union. Finansbank is owned by the National Bank of Greece (NBG), who purchased a 45% stake in 2009 and raised holdings to more than 77% in the same year (Platt, 2010). Even as Greece’s economy struggles, it invests in Turkey through its banking sector. However, the Turkish banking sector holds many opportunities for growth. Only 80% of its GDP stems from the banking sector, compared to 350% in the E.U. (Platt, 2010). Loans by Turkish banks were only 27% of GDP compared with 196% in the E.U. (Platt, 2010). This disparity indicates that there is plenty of room to grow. Leading companies in Turkey have great track records and many will look towards launching efforts in commercial and corporate sectors. The banking system is strong and no financial institution has needed aid from the government throughout the global financial crisis. Another strong sector in Turkey is the fast growing tourism industry which has a new focus on being eco-friendly. Presently, the ratio of currency is 1 U.S dollar to 1.5 Turkish liras. Turkey has the seventeenth largest economy in the world as of 2010 with a GDP of $958.3 billion and ranks seventh among European countries in terms of economic size (Pierni, 2010).

    From a European standpoint, Turkey is a large country in relation to its size in population and land area. Compared to France, Turkey’s area is much larger and, if accepted into the E.U., would become the largest E.U. member state.  The area of the E.U. would increase by 20% and its population by almost 16% (Bleke, 2005). This increase in size can be seen as a benefit as it allows the E.U. to gain strength in numbers. Accession could also increase the E.U.’s potential to become an international actor. The addition of Turkey could also signal a change in relations with the Middle East. By making Turkey a member, the European Union could increase efforts to promote regional stability and continue efforts to fight terrorism.

    While prospective benefits exist so do potential risks or “costs.” According to the European Commission report, Turkey would be a net recipient of major E.U. funds and resources. With their standing budget, the E.U. would have to take away funds from current recipients to attribute the appropriate funds to Turkey (Caymar, 2009). What appears to be the most threatening of costs, especially to strong states like Germany and France, is Turkey’s standing population of about 75 million. Such a large population would allot Turkey many seats of representation in E.U. institutions, making it one of the “most powerful member states.” Also, the idea has been raised that the Home Affairs and Justice policies may be “strained” as the European Union would directly be “exposed” to the unstable Middle East (Caymar, 2009). Another hot topic in the issue of the cost debate is Turkish emigration. With an enlarged European Union comes free movement and many anticipate Turkish emigrants will invade borders to find new work. The concern that Turkish citizens will take European jobs is a prospective cost.

    Eurobarometer: Opinion Polls in France & Germany

    The second relationship I examined was that between nationalism and attitudes towards Turkey’s accession. This question was tested through the use of the Eurobarometer public opinion polls. The Eurobarometer is a series of surveys performed regularly by the European commission, a body within the European Union. The commission provides these surveys to all the member states and has questions that pertain to the E.U. The countries of France and Germany were chosen in this study for statistical testing in answering these questions because they are the ones with political actors and citizens who are most openly against Turkey’s accession. Through the crosstabulation of two questions, one about Turkey’s accession and the other regarding how nationalistic a person is, I discover that there is a small connection between the two; however, it is not very strong.

    The 2008 Eurobarometer survey in Germany asked the questions: “Would you be in favor or against Turkey becoming part of the European Union in the future? On a scale from “1” to “10” – where “1” means you feel not content at all and “10” means you feel very content. The second question is “How do you feel about being European?” (Table 1). The second question more simply translates into “how nationalistic do you think you are?” The results of this crosstabulation are that 75.8% of the people surveyed who rate themselves as 1 to 3 on the level of contentedness are against Turkey’s membership to the European Union while only 24.2% are in favor of it. Those that rated themselves as 7 to 10 on a scale of contentedness were 15% in favor and 85% were against the membership. Even though the number of people (85%) who said they were more nationalistic and against Turkey was greater than those who were not very nationalistic and against Turkey (75.8%), the number of those against Turkey is just too large to ignore. Dually, the number of those who favor Turkey’s membership and are less nationalistic is only a small 24.2%. The chi-square test (Table 2) shows that there is no statistically significant difference between nationality and attitudes on Turkish accession in Germany.

    The results for a series of questions to the E.U. member state of France yield similar results. The questions asked were: “Would you be in favor or against Turkey becoming part of the European Union in the future? To what extent do you personally feel you are nationalistic?” (Table 3). The number of people who to “a great extent” felt nationalistic was 82.5% against Turkey’s membership with 17.4% in favor of it. Those at the far end of the spectrum that were “not at all” nationalistic were 75% against and 25% in favor of the accession. What this comparison means is that out of all those surveyed, the majority of the people surveyed were against Turkey’s accession. The trend here is that the more nationalistic one is, the more likely they are to be against accession. The chi-square test (Table 4) is statistically significant.

    These results are surprisingly different from what I hypothesized. I assumed that the more nationalistic a person was, the more likely they would be opposed to Turkey’s accession and vice-versa. However, the result is that the general populous, regardless of feelings of nationality, is against Turkey’s accession.

    The next set of tests that I ran involved questions regarding the birthplace of the respondents. I wanted to see if there was a relationship between those who were born within a European Union state and attitude against Turkey’s accession. Again, I chose to use the two E.U. member states of Germany and France. The question asked in both states is:

    You personally, were you born…?
    Choices:
    In (OUR COUNTRY)
    In another Member Country of the European Union
    In Europe, but not in a Member Country of the European Union En Europe,
    In Asia, in Africa or in Latin America, in Northern America, in Japan or in Oceania
    Refusal (SPONTANEOUS)

    The results for Germany can be seen in Table 5. Of the many respondents who said they were born in Germany, 39.4% were against accession and 60.6% were in favor of Turkey’s membership; that is the part that was most interesting. Table 6, shows that, in Germany, there is not a significant difference between the place of birth and position on the accession. The results for France are different. In Table 7, the results show that the people born in France are more likely to be against Turkish membership in the E.U. than those born in another E.U. state. In the “against” column starting at the top, the number is a high 85.0%. However, the numbers in that column decrease as the other countries not in the E.U. are listed. The finding is statistically significant, as Table 8 shows; the chi-square is significant at .001.

    The results of this test are closer to what I predicted. I expected those who were born in an E.U. country would be against Turkey’s accession, while those who were not born within the E.U. would favor it. In regards to France, my prediction was correct. The number of people against Turkey was higher for those born within France. On the other hand, this correlation does not pertain to Germany. In Germany, despite place of birth, there was a general opposition to Turkey’s membership. The chi-square test also proves that there was no strong connection between the two factors.

    Conclusion

    In terms of the investigation of prospective costs and benefits of Turkey joining the European Union, I discovered that Turkey’s economic sector would be a great benefit and that the costs are marginal. Turkey’s economic sector is ideal for European integration. The political cost of  Turkey becoming a powerful member is a small cost to pay for prospective positive relationships in the Middle East.

    The above results from the statistic tests demonstrate, contrary to my initial belief, that there is not a substantial relationship between nationalism/nationality and attitudes towards Turkey’s accession. Although France did have a significance level in favor of this relationship, the trend was not what I initially predicted. Those participants that were not nationalistic still did not greatly favor Turkey’s accession. Germany’s results proved to be different than France in that there was no evidence to relate nationality and attitude towards the accession. The overall consensus for both France and Germany is that they do not want Turkey to join the European Union.

    The results of the two tests above paint an interesting picture. Turkey is a country that could favorably change things in the European Union but is largely disliked as a prospective member by two of the largest E.U. states. In the assessment of my research question regarding a prejudice toward Turkey, I have only laid the fundamental groundwork and the question must be further investigated. The positive conclusion with the economic test and then with (the majority) public opinion polls in which Turkey is rejected as an E.U. state, leads one to ask, “why?” What is the quality that makes Turkey unfavorable? It is not economic doubt, and it really is not a question of them being “un-European”. What about Germany that causes the majority to disregard Turkey as a potential E.U. member? Although both France and Germany have lots of Turkish emigrants, Germany is perceived as being extremely discontented with the thought of Turkey’s accession. What is the cause of this? Could Islam be the main cause for rejection? This assumption could not be properly researched because the Eurobarometer does not include questions regarding religion. These are the questions that have surfaced in my investigation of Turkey’s delay in becoming a member of the European Union. This topic must be further researched in order to discover the true reason of this delay.

    References

    • Avci, G. (n.d.). Turkey’s slow EU candidacy: Insurmountable hurdles to membership or simple Euro-skepticism? Retrieved from http://www.informaworld.com
    • Belke, A. (2005). Turkey in transition to EU membership: Pros and cons of integrating a dynamic economy. Intereconomics, 39(6), 288-394.
    • Bideleux, R. & Jefferies, I. (1998). A history of Eastern Europe: Crisis and change. London: Routledge.
    • Camyar, I. (2009). On temporal determinants of European Union enlargement: The case of Turkey’s accession. Comparative European Politics, 7, 233-254. doi:10.1057/cep.2008.18.
    • Dardanelli, P. (1999). Implementing Subsidiarity: Regional Policy from a British Perspective. Regional and Federal Studies, 9(2), 69-88.
    • Mattli, W., & Plumber, T. (2005). The demand-side politics of EU enlargement: Democracy and the application for EU membership. In F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier (Eds.), The politics of European Union enlargement. New York: Routledge.
    • Mayhew, A. (1998). Recreating Europe: The European Union’s policy towards central and eastern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    • Nugent, N. (ED.). (2004). European Union enlargement. New York: Palgrave.
    • Pierni, M. (2010 May 7). The European Union and Turkey in 2010. [Editorial]. Hurriyet Daily News & Economic Review. Retrieved from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=the-european-union-and-turkey-in-2010-2010-05-07
    • Platt, G. (2010 May). Economy bounces back. Global Finance. Retrieved from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3715/is_201005/ai_n53929418/
    • Schimmelfennig, F. (2001) The community trap: Liberal norms, rhetorical action and the eastern enlargement of the European Union. International Organization 55(1): 47–80.
    • Schimmelfennig, F., & Sedelmeier, U. (2005). The politics of European Union enlargement. New York: Routledge.
    • Taylor, P. (1996). The European Union in the 1990s. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Table 1: Eurobarometer Data Assessment: Germany

    Questions:
    Would you be in favor or against Turkey becoming part of the European Union in the future?
    On a scale from ‘1’ to ‘10’ – where ‘1’ means you feel not content at all and ‘10’ means you feel very content, how do you feel about being (NATIONALITY)?

    Feelings of nationalism In favor of Turkey's EU membership Against Turkey's EU membership Total
    Not content (1-3) Count % 8
    24.2%
    25
    75.8%
    33
    100.0%
    Fairly content (4-6) Count % 26
    18.6%
    114
    81.4%
    140
    100.0%
    Content (7-10) Count % 116
    15.0%
    656
    85.0%
    772
    100.0%
    Total Count % 150
    15.9%
    795
    84.1%
    945
    100.0%

    Table 2: Chi-Square Tests of Significance for Eurobarometer Data Assessment: Germany

     

    Value

    df

    Asymp. Sig.
    (2-sided

    Pearson Chi-Square 2.909 2 0.233
    Likelihood Ratio 2.688 2 0.261
    Linear-by-Linear
    Association
    2.85 1 0.091
    N of Valid Cases 945    

    Table 3: Eurobarometer Data Assessment: France

    Questions:
    Would you be in favour or against Turkey becoming part of the European Union in the future?
    To what extent do you personally feel you are nationalistic?

    Feelings of
    nationalism
    In favor of
    Turkey’s EU
    membership
    Against
    Turkey’s EU
    membership
    Total
    To a great Extent
    Count
    %
    129
    17.4%
    611
    82.5%
    740
    100.0%
    Somewhat
    Count
    %
    43
    27.3%
    114
    72.6%
    157
    100.0%
    Not really
    Count
    %
    10
    35.7%
    18
    64.3%
    28
    100.0%
    Not at all
    Count
    %
    3
    25.0%
    9
    75.0%
    12
    100.0%
    Total
    Count
    %
    185
    100.0%
    752
    100.0%
    937
    100.0%

    Table 4: Chi-Square Tests of Significance for Eurobarometer Data Assessment: France

     

    Value

    df

    Asymp.Sig. (2-
    sided)

    Pearson Chi-Square 13.002 3 0.005
    Likelihood Ratio 11.96 3 0.008
    Linear-by-Linear
    Association
    10.578 1 0.001
    N of Valid Cases 937    

    Table 5: Correlation of National Background Respondents in Germany (D41) with Favouring E.U. Membership for Turkey (QA44)

     

     

    Birthplace

    In favor of
    Turkey’s EU membership

    Against
    Turkey’s EU membership

    Total

    In Germany
    Count
    %
    383
    39.4%
    559
    60.6%
    922
    100.0%
    In another EU
    state
    Count
    %
    9
    42.9%
    12
    57.1%
    21
    100.0%
    Europe, but not
    EU
    Count
    %
    1
    33.3%
    2
    66.7%
    3
    100.%
    Africa, Asia,
    Latin America
    Count
    %
    14
    48.3%
    15
    51.7%
    29
    100.0%
    North America, Japan, Oceania
    Count
    %
    1
    100.0%
    0
    0.0%
    1
    100.0%
    Total
    Count
    %
    388
    39.8%
    588
    60.2%
    976
    100.0%
     

    Table 6: Chi-Square Tests of Significance for National Background of Respondents in Germany (D41) with Favouring E.U. Membership for Turkey (QA44)

     

    Value

    df

    Asymp. Sig. (2-
    sided)

    Pearson Chi-Square 2.587a 4 0.629
    Likelihood Ratio 2.901 4 0.575
    Linear-by-Linear
    Association
    1.436 1 0.231
    N of Valid Cases 976    

    a. 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected value is .40.

    Table 7: Correlation of National Background of Respondents in France (D41) with Favouring E.U. Membership for Turkey (QA44)

     

     

    Birthplace

    In favor of Turkey’s
    EU membership

    Against
    Turkey’s EU membership
    Total
    In France
    Count
    %
    53
    15.0%
    300
    85.0%
    353
    100.0%
    In another EU state
    Count
    %
    24
    25.8%
    69
    74.2%
    93
    100.0%
    Europe, but not EU
    Count
    %
    2
    18.2%
    9
    81.8%
    11
    100.%
    Africa, Asia, Latin
    America
    Count
    %
    4
    57.1%
    3
    42.9%
    7
    100.0%
    North America,
    Japan, Oceania
    Count
    %
    1
    100.0%
    0
    0.0%
    1
    100.0%
    Total
    Count
    %
    84
    18.1%
    381
    81.9%
    465
    100.0%
     

    Table 8: Chi-Square Tests of Significance for National Background of Respondents in France (D41) with Favouring E.U. Membership for Turkey (QA44)

     

    Value

    df

    Asymp. Sig. (2-
    sided)

    Pearson Chi-Square 17.743a 4 .001
    Likelihood Ratio 14.496 4 .006
    Linear-by-Linear
    Association
    13.575 1 .000
    N of Valid Cases 465    

    a. 4 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5.
    The minimum expected count is .18.