Education and Civil Unrest


Does increased educational access lead to more or less civil unrest? In this paper I focus on the relationship between education and civil unrest. The effect of education on civil unrest has received little attention in scholarly literature. Scholars have theorized or hypnotized but never presented empirical evidence. Thus I examine the ideas of Relative Deprivation and the Human Capital Theory to explain why educated individuals might engage in civil unrest. Using a negative binominal regression model, I examine the relationship of education and civil unrest in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1997-2010.

Table of Contents: 


    What is the relationship between higher education and civil unrest? Many scholars have investigated the relationship between civil war, education, and the duration of peace (Buckland 2005; Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2004:10; Heyneman 2003; Lai and Thyne 2007). On the one hand there is the traditional modernization perspective (see Lipset 1959) which contends that the better educated the population of a country the better the chances for stability and democracy (Lipset 1959). Others argue that educational access, particularly higher education access, “may promote social unrest and political instability” (Friedman and Friedman 1980). Although there has been a growing literature on educational access and civil conflict (i.e. civil wars—for a review see Ishiyama and Breunign 2011) there has been considerably less work on the relationship between educational access and civil unrest. In this paper I focus on whether access to education leads to more or less civil unrest.

    Despite the growing number of works that pay attention to the relationship between education and civil war, there remains considerable uncertainty over the relationship between educational access and civil unrest. Much of the literature suggests that education can play a positive role in promoting peace. This is reflected in the observations of Peter Buckman (2006, 7) when he noted that “education can heal the wounds of war, solve youth unemployment, deliver decentralization and democracy, build peace and promote economic/social development.” Recent studies have shown that “education does not cause wars, nor does it end them,” but it does have the potential to play a significant role both directly and indirectly in building peace and reversing the damage wrought by civil war (Buckland 2006, 8; see also Buckland 2005).  On the other hand, other works have certainly suggested that educational access can lead to greater political demands and potentially more political instability (see, for example, Deutsch 1961).

    In this paper then, I examine whether education can be a unifying force where individuals may have too much to lose to engage in civil unrest especially when civil unrest is a representation of the public, or whether it can cause a violent disagreement because of unsatisfied demands and expectations placed by elites. In other words, what is the relationship between educational access and forms of conflict?

    Literature Review

    A growing body of work is emerging on education and conflict (Buckland 2006; Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2004; Heyneman 2003; Lai and Thyne 2007). In general, scholars tend to focus on the spread of education as it relates to civil conflict and civil war (Buckland 2005; Davies 2004; Gallagher, 2004). The three major areas of education and conflict are: 1) the negative impacts conflict may have on an educational system (Lai and Thyne 2007); 2) the content of educational standards including curricula that relate to peace (Davies 2004; Bush and Saltarelli 2000); 3) the probability of the start or restart of a major civil conflict when people have access to education. For example, a recent study done by Ishiyama and Breuning (2011) focuses on how educational opportunity (or the ability of people to have access to education) affects the probability of the start or restart of a major civil conflict. Ishiyama and Breuning found that increased access to education in general, but early access to higher education in particular, acts to diminish the likelihood of civil war restart.

    Ishiyama and Breuning tested two primary hypotheses as to why increased educational access decreases the likelihood of the restart of conflict in post civil war societies: 1) promoting education sends a signal to the people that the government cares about them, therefore buying off the population; 2) receiving an education increases the opportunity costs for rebels to rebel hence reducing the likelihood that former rebel will restart conflict.

    Recently scholars have presented an extensive amount of research that has explained the effects of civil war on education. The studies tend to be in terms of the physical effects a conflict can have on an education system (Fearon and Laitin: 2003, Lai and Thyne: 2007).  Generally the literature can be divided into three areas, including, first, studies that examine the destructive effect of education on conflict; second, studies that focus on how education promotes democracy and stability, and hence prevents conflict (Friedman 1955: Lipset 1959); third (and for my purposes the most relevant), those that examine how educational access affects the probability of conflict. In particular, there is limited research on the relationship between education and civil unrest. In recent years, scholars have only just begun to argue about the relationship between education and civil unrest or post conflict reconstruction (Buckland 2005: Davies 2010: Heyneman 2003: Thyne 2006). This omission is rather surprising when every education system has the potential to either aggravate the conditions that lead to violent conflict or help heal them (Buckland 2005).

    The first approach focuses on the effects conflict has on an education system. For example, Lai and Thyne ( 2007) point to three negative effects civil war has on education: civil war destroys educational infrastructure, it decimates teaching personnel, and negatively affects the quality of education. Buckland (2005) finds that civil war occurrence has a negative effect on both the quality and the quantity of teachers at primary and secondary educational levels.

    A second approach emphasizes that education can cause rising social and political demands (Friedman 1955; Lipset 1959; Heyneman 2003). Lipset argues that educational enrollment in primary, secondary, and tertiary levels are equally related to the degree of democracy, and education spreads the basic requirements of democracy. This is because the more people are educated, the more likely they are to demand political participation. Freidman (1955) argues that “a stable and democratic society is impossible without a minimum degree of literacy and knowledge on part of most citizens and without widespread acceptance of a common set of values.” Heyneman (2003:29-30) argues that schools teach individuals social, political, and legal principles that inspire good citizenship, requirements for political leaders, expected behaviors of citizens, and the consequences of those behaviors. Second, schools encourage social ability and teach people how to work together peacefully. Third, schools try to provide equality of opportunity for students, giving each a chance for success. Finally, school systems combine a wide range of groups while trying to establish a common underpinning for citizenship.

    Although education can lead to democracy, it can also lead to something else. Karl Deutsch (1961) argued that modernization (and with it the expansion of education) would lead to a rising tide of social mobilization—a transformation of society and greater demands for material and political benefits on the part of the population. Further, Davies (1962) and Gurr (1968) argue that if these aspirations for material and political benefits are frustrated, civil violence may be the result. Davies (1962, 6) points especially to needs satisfaction as a crucial factor in revolution. He posits that  as time progresses throughout a revolution there is an intolerable gap between what people want and what they actually get. He theorizes that prolonged economic growth and political autonomy produce continually rising expectations, which result in frustration and, ultimately, revolutions. Gurr also argues that frustrated human beings engage in potentially aggressive collective behavior. Given that educational access provides for “rising expectations” there is reason to believe that if individuals are frustrated, aggression and violence may occur.

    The third approach focuses on whether the degree of access to education is likely to contribute to conflict (Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2010; Nkinyangi 1969; Thyne 2010). Thyne (2006) contends that education might affect the probability of civil war onset. He examines two factors: 1) educational investments provide a strong signal to the people that the government is trying to improve lives; 2) education can generate economic, political, and social stability by giving people tools that can resolve disputes peacefully. Thyne draws two conclusions. First, he says that educational investments lower grievances that could provoke rebellion in society. The results from logistic regression of 160 from 1980-1999 indicate that education lowers the probability of civil war. Second, Thyne reports that a poorly funded educational system generates poverty and inequality, each of which has been found to increase the likelihood of civil war (Mohammed 1999; Hegre et al. 2001; Sambanis 2001; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Collier et al. 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Thyne also acknowledges that “higher levels of education (can) lead to a higher probability of civil distress, as students lead protests for political change” (2006). Indeed, students on university campuses are often in the forefront of antigovernment activism. Bush and Saltarelli (2000) present guidelines for understanding the dynamics of both positive and negative impacts of education and violent conflict. In a broad sense, education both mitigates and contributes to conflict. Bush and Saltarelli argue that “in many conflicts around the world, education is part of the problem not the solution, because it serves to divide and antagonize groups both intentionally and unintentionally” (33). Further individuals who have access to higher education place greater demands on their government because their expectations keep rising as they become more educated. Indeed,  “education broadens men’s outlook, enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational electoral choices” (Lipset 1959).

    Thus, there are two general perspectives on the effects of education on the likelihood of civil conflict. On the one hand, scholars (Thyne 2006; Grossman 1991, 1999) have argued that educated individuals have more economic opportunities which make them less likely to risk death or prison by joining a rebellion. The economic models of civil war suggest that those with the most to lose (educated) should be the least likely to risk death by joining insurgencies. Weinstein (2005) provides an example of the single-party-dominated All Peoples in Congress (APC) in Sierra Leone in the 1980s. University students began protesting against the single-party. A strong response from the government caused the students to retreat, and the students were replaced by a violent mob of unemployed and uneducated youth from Urban Freetown.

    Carmen Kynard (2005) argues the opposite—that protest of rhetoric speaks powerfully to the possibility of altering old conditions by rhetorically creating new demands. Black students in the United States changed and shaped the pace of the civil rights movements as well as the character of higher education. Their protests during the 1960s created new demands for the African American population. Those new demands included increased black recruitment at white universities, black studies departments, and black centers and dormitories. In the period 1965-1968 the black presence changed the contour of academic and learning. This is clear example of how powerful civil unrest can be, and the outcomes that can be achieved through protests.

    General Theory

    Scholars have recently argued about the relationship between education and civil conflict (Buckland 2005; Bush and Saltareli 2000; Davies 2010; Thyne 2006). As mentioned above, scholars have argued that civil conflict has a negative effect on education. Thyne (2006) argues that education could possibly affect the probability of civil war onset. This study, however, seeks to investigate the effects of educational access on civil unrest. Education is a renewable resource that requires funding in order to expand in terms of curriculum and technology. In a wider scope, education has a formative and lasting effect on a person’s mind, character, and physical ability. In this regard, fully understanding what educational access is can eliminate uncertainties further throughout this study.

    Educational access is narrowly defined as students who have access to tertiary studies, i.e., the opportunity to receive an education at the university level. It is also imperative to distinguish between civil conflict and civil unrest. Civil conflict is conceptually hard to define but is commonly referred to as a violent armed battle within a state. This study, however, does not focus on civil conflict but on civil unrest. Civil unrest is defined as a disturbance caused by a group of people; it can be either by violent or peaceful means. Civil unrest includes acts such as protests, riots, strikes, and demonstrations. In this respect, Thyne (2006) argues that university campuses are often the center of civil disobedience in a society. It must be noted that civil unrest can be categorized as violent disturbances as well as different acts as listed above. Educational access may lead to a higher probability of civil distress, as students lead protests for political change. This paper is primarily related to Thyne’s argument.

    Previous studies on education and civil conflict show that civil conflict has a negative impact on the education system (Buckland 2005; Davies 2004; Gallagher, 2004.).Civil conflict has the capacity to destroy educational systems. The negative impacts include physical damage to schools, decimation of teaching personell, and cuts in educational spending for military use (Lai and Thyne 2007). While these factors are important, no scholar has directly related them to civil unrest. It must be noted that the three factors are only one set of influences on the occurrence of civil unrest. Friedman and Friedman (1980) hypothesized that higher education may promote social unrest and political instability. Yet scholars have neglected to test the relationship between education and civil unrest. Thus we examine the factors of educational access and the promotion of civil unrest to comprehend the relationship.

    In order to understand the relationship, we must take into consideration several factors, the first of which is educational expenditures. In certain cases, but not all, the government funds a portion of students’ education for higher learning at public institutions. Amutabi (2002) states “unlike Europe and America where they enjoy forms of autonomy, the most basic of policy and structure in Kenyan universities are legislated and enacted by the government” (4). Thus certain universities rely solely on the government for funding. This can suggest why students (educated people) become frustrated when educational expenditures are cut by the government. Educational expenditures are subsidies (grants, scholarships, and loans) that fund programs within that institution. The economic difficulties of a sovereign state directly affect higher educational institutions in most cases.

    For example, as economic conditions decline, there is a reduction in the standard of living and the ability of countries to provide basic needs and services such as food, shelter, water and sanitation, health care, and education to all their people (Amutabi, 2002). Economics affects the education system by cutting back on student subsidies and on teacher allowances. Therefore, this causes a decline in the number of students who can attend the university based on financial ability. It also causes a decrease in adequate teachers because money for training is absent. Lastly, it creates a decline in the equipment that is available, including textbooks, supplies, and lab equipment. (See World Bank.)

    Cuts in educational expenditures create an overall decline in the quality of education. Research has shown that countries with inadequate public-funding and resource diversification, while still admitting students, experience a decline in educational quality (see World Bank 2010). By quality I mean students are not equipped with the necessary tools for adequate learning because textbooks, desks, lab equipment, and teachers are missing. Without the proper gains made by the universities, higher educational intuitions find it hard to maintain the student-teacher ratio and may experience overcrowding in lecture halls, loss ability to repair  buildings,  inability to replace teaching equipment, and no funds for investment in research and new training for instructors (World Bank 2010).

    Unlike private institutions, public institutions depend on the government for financial stability. Therefore, this may suggest that civil unrest happens when a country spends lots of money on education and then cuts the funding substantially, whereas a country that spends very little money on education but does not cut the spending will not experience civil unrest. Educational systems with a low amount of funding tend to be resourceful in terms of budgetary assets, so they can still provide the bare essentials when it comes to a quality education. While an educational system that has an unlimited amount of funds may not be as resourceful, they do have funds to spend on other assets such as extracurricular activities. The World Bank (2010) supports this argument by noting that “countries with the lowest levels of spending per student probably provide insufficient funding to assure services of a reasonable quality, while those with the highest levels probably have systems that are wasteful” (Mingat, Ledoux, and Rakotomalala 2009, 20). Therefore we can conclude these two things: if there is a decrease in educational expenditures (funding for higher education institutions, including student and teacher subsides) there is likely to be increase in civil unrest. If there is a decrease in the quality of education (availability of materials, equipment, and suitable learning conditions) there is likely to be an increase in civil unrest.

    Higher education studies primarily focus on one specific subject. The government issues a standard curriculum, which refers to the sequence of learning experiences in view of producing a desired outcome. Desired outcomes in this context foreshadow the main concepts of the entire course. For example, an economics course teaches production, distribution, and consumption of goods. Such a course would include key terms like gross domestic product (GDP), demand and supply, equilibrium, etc. Once the course is complete, the student should be able to reproduce the acquired knowledge. This becomes vital once individuals enter the labor market and have to produce economic value for themselves.

    The problem, however, is that, within the curriculum, elites (universities, education boards, and discipline licensing agencies) have the sole power to control what will and will not be taught to the students. For instance, Davies states (2010) “learning about genocide is not universally accepted as a part of the curriculum, especially in countries that have experienced it” (492). This can ultimately create a gap in the prosperity between educated individuals and under- educated or non-educated individuals. Formal education provides the knowledge, skills, and, to a degree, the experience for advancement into the labor market (Loomis and Rodriguez 2009). Education links individuals to certain socioeconomic groups based on the level of education and work experience. Therefore, individuals who are not granted educational access or a “complete education” (courses that evoke all concepts such as human rights, genocide, historical events, research, etc.) are likely to engage in civil unrest because a higher level of income establishes a higher socioeconomic status. The competition, however, does not start with employment but with education (Loomis and Rodriguez 2009).

    In this section we introduce the “Human Capital” theory (Gurr 1973) which refers to the stock of competence, knowledge, and personality attributes embodied in the ability to perform labor so as to produce economic value. Plainly, these attributes are gained by a worker through education and experience. Primary and secondary education in the United States stresses the importance of higher education in order to maintain stability for the future. Through the human capital theory students are taught that individuals with more schooling generally earn significantly more income (Loomis and Rodriguez 2009). Thus Paulsen and Smart (2001) argue that “students choose whether or not to attend college based on their perception of the returns (earning differentials) related to their investment.”

    From this analysis I have concluded a twofold theoretical argument: 1) educated individuals place more educational access demands on the government; and 2) students have high expectations of their government to place them into a lucrative labor market, so if educated individuals receive education without the labor market it is likely that civil unrest will occur. Let me clarify what I mean by educational access demands. Educated individuals understand the idea to a certain degree that if one attends higher education institutions, he or she is able to acquire a quality education which equals economic stability and growth for their future. Therefore, individuals insist on educational access. On the other hand, educated individuals also have high expectations of their government. Education has created certain expectation in the sense that the government is responsible for creating jobs, maintaining economic stability, and creating equal opportunity for all once students have obtained a bachelor’s degree. When students graduate from tertiary studies, they have rising expectations of being placed into a lucrative labor market. If not, the government is at fault because it cannot produce economic stability and greater economic opportunities for its graduates. This relates to Gurr’s (1973) arguments of relative deprivation. This is also known as “revolution of rising expectations” where “men become angered because they acquire new or intensified expectations which cannot be satisfied at their disposal” this uniquely leads to revolutions (365). Weinstein (2007) argues that economic changes give rise to social discontent as individuals experience a discrepancy between what they think they should have and what they actually have.

    The United States has recently seen an increase in unemployment rates for its university graduates but has not seen much civil unrest. This is because the United States has an indirect form of democracy. If individuals are not satisfied with the representation of the public they can change it through elections. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the world often do not have this  luxury. This does not dismiss the feelings of individuals in the United States, but simply gives a possible explanation to why civil unrest is not as high in the U.S. as in other countries. Democratic institutions help mitigate the tendency toward civil unrest because the presence of democratic change provides unemployed college graduates with a nonviolent way to release their frustrations short of civil unrest. But in countries where democratic institutions are limited or non-existent, the frustrated college graduate sees little alternative to civil unrest and may also feel he has little to lose.

    Research Design

    To test the above hypothesis I collected data on forty-two countries in Sub Saharan Africa from 1997 to 2010.  Cape Verde, Comoros, and Mauritius were excluded due to lack of data.  The unit of analysis is country-year, and the data was collected on the number of riots and protests in a given year in a given country, as well as on primary, secondary, and higher education enrollment rates. Additional data was collected for the control variables in the model, which included level of democracy, GDP annual growth rates, incidence of civil war, and ethnic polarization.

    In order to investigate the effects of educational access on civil unrest I used the ACLED database (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data- ACLED 2011). This database provides the date, location, type of event, rebel and other groups involved, and changes in territorial control. Specifics on battles, killings, riots, and recruitment activities by rebels, governments, militias, armed groups, protesters and civilians are available for all reported conflict events in 50 developing countries (although I only used the African cases with accessible data).

    From the ACLED data base I selected events labeled as protest and riots. Given that I was primarily interested in how educational access affects the incidence of civil unrest nationally (as opposed to by region) my unit of analysis is country-year. I have selected all countries in the Sub-Saharan region. Only forty-two countries experienced protests or riots between 1997 and 2010 (due to accessible data). I counted each event and aggregated them by country year. I counted a total 6,567 protest/riots. See Table 1.

    Dependent Variable

    For the dependent variable I relied on the ACLED definition of civil unrest.Riots/Protests are defined as “actors involved, respectively, in violent rioting or peaceful protests. Riots are defined as a violent disturbance of the public peace by three or more persons assembled for a common purpose” (ACLED 2011). Thus, my dependent variable is a count of the number of Riots/Protests that occur in a particular country in a given year. Within the dataset two forms of civil unrest are categorized together as one event. Due to the cluster of events in the ACLED database, it was not possible to distinguish between a peaceful protest and a violent riot.

    Independent Variables

    As for my independent variable I measured the data on primary and secondary student enrollments per capita as well as university enrollment per capita by year as reported by the Cross National Time Series data set from 1997-2010. This data set provides annual data for a range of countries from 1815 to the present. It is one of the “leading datasets on political violence.” Enrollment is defined as the number of persons who attend a course in school. The enrollment data provides a ratio of total enrollment regardless of age and directly corresponds to the indicated level of education (primary, secondary, tertiary). Referring to my hypothesis, civil unrest is more than likely to occur when there is greater access to higher education. A high enrollment rate reflects a greater amount of access.

    To test the above hypothesis I also include an interactive measure of educational enrollments per capita X GDP growth rates. According to the hypothesis above, if GDP growth is low or negative and enrollments per capita are high (and especially higher education enrollments) there would be an increased likelihood of civil unrest. If GDP growth remains positive, however, we expect the opposite effect which would mean less civil unrest.

    Control Variables

    In this paper I control for important additional factors such as GDP per capita growth, civil war, regime type using polity 2, and ethnic polarization. I control for economic growth because Collier and Hoeffler (2004) demonstrated that a strong inverse relationship exists between economic development and conflict. Economic growth measured in GDP per capita growth and per capita income reduces the likelihood of civil war occurrence. From this we can only conclude that it applies to civil unrest because no prior research has indicated otherwise. Therefore a higher economic growth rate provides a strong incentive not to engage in civil unrest and acts as a restriction to the resumption of conflict.

    In addition, I control for civil war because it is likely there is a great increase in protest and riot during a time of conflict or time of civil war. Civil war is used as dummy variable indicating whether a country had a distinct civil war within the previous year. If a country has engaged in conflict within a previous year we coded it as 1 and if the country had not engaged in any form of civil war it received a 0.

    I also coded for regime type using polity 2. I did this to determine if there was a difference between democratic and autocratic regimes in terms or conflict or conflict renewal. As mentioned above, the outcome of the previous conflict affects the likelihood of civil unrest outbreak.

    Finally I controlled for ethnic polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol’s 2005). Conflict and presumable riots and protest may result from ethnic tension particularly if one large group is pitted against another (which is more likely in fractionalized societies). To measure ethnic polarization I use the index of Ethnic Polarization. Ethnic polarization is highest when there are two equally sized groups. The value diminishes as the number of groups increase, but also as the percentage share of the population of the largest group increases.


    A negative binominal is used to test and analyze the relationship between education and civil unrest. The methodological reasoning for using this is because the model is chosen based on the parameters of the dependent variable. My dependent variable is an event count with a range 0-262 and a majority of the observations fall between 0-80. Using a negative binomial model is necessary because if I used a Poisson model (another event count model) and heterogeneity and overdispersion existed within my model, the heterogeneity assumption would be violated and unable to use. Continuing to use the Poisson model with overdispersion, my standard errors will be underestimated and the coefficients (the effect of your independent variables on your dependent variable) will be overestimated. Thus, a negative binomial model is used because it relaxes this condition and allows for overdispersion.


    Table 2 reports the results of the negative binominal regression model. The interaction between higher education and GDP growth causes a statistically significant decrease in civil unrest. The results support the proposed hypothesis; increased university enrollment and economic growth together decrease the frequency of riots and protests in African countries.

    In addition, the results report that increases in primary and secondary education also increase civil unrest. Relatively speaking although the measure is small, the results show that individuals who do not have access to higher education experience unrest because they understand the idea of stability. Individuals understand stability based on the Human Capital theory has which explains more education and experience equals a greater salary. Therefore, individuals demand educational access and if not granted, individuals engage in civil unrest. Lastly, higher education proves to be statically significant. Increases in higher level education enrollment, increases the likelihood of civil unrest. In this we conclude that Thyne’s (2006) hypothesis was correct, that more students riot because they are the voice of political change.

    The control variables were insignificant. Polity 2 scores, civil war, the measure of ethnic polarization were largely unrelated to whether civil unrest occurred. This suggests that democracy, previous conflict, and ethnic polarization are largely unrelated to civil unrest.


    The above paper suggests that an increase in higher level education (measured by university enrollment) increases the likelihood of civil unrest disturbances. This supports some of the literature that suggests that educational access actually increases the likelihood of civil unrest (Thyne 2006; Buckland 2005; Bush and Saltarelli 2000; Davies 2004:10; Heyneman 2003; Lai and Thyne 2007). Further, I find a strong interactive effect between educational access and economic growth. The results suggest that increases in higher level education coupled with an increased GDP growth rate decreases civil unrest. From this I conclude that educated individuals are less likely to protest because economic expansion provides economic opportunities.

    In addition, primary and secondary enrollments have a positive effect on civil unrest. This suggests that individuals with even a minimal degree of education cause more disturbances when there are few economic opportunities. Higher education is also significantly related to civil unrest. Thus, my analysis indicates that increased opportunities in higher education, without economic opportunities, do increase the likelihood of civil unrest disturbances.

    In this paper I did not examine countries that have strong democratic institutions. Only in countries where democratic institutions are little to non-existent do frustrated college graduates see little alternative to civil unrest and may also feel they have less to lose. Therefore, an extension of this work will focus on explaining education and civil unrest in countries that have weak representative institutions compared to countries that have strong representative institutions.

    In sum, greater attention should be paid in the literature to education and civil unrest. This literature can help explain the rationale behind educated individuals and forms of protest/riots.Therefore both education and political science scholars interested in conflict reduction should pay close attention to the unexplored area of the impact of higher education on civil unrest.


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    Table 1: Descriptive Statistics



    Mean Std.Dev Min Max
    Protest Count 544


    27.45 0 253
    245 2201.77 596.17 837 3891
    Higher Education Enrollment 253 40.98 37.03 3 162
    GDP Growth 431 3.71 8.26 -28.09 106.28
    Polity2 573 0.63 6.55 -9 10
    Prior Civil War 591 0.01 0.08 0 1

    Table 2: Coefficient Estimates, Civil Unrest, Negative Binomial Regression Results

    Variable Coefficient
    (Robust SE)
    Enrollments in Higher Education X GDP growth rate -.003***
    Enrollments in primary and secondary school per capita (x1000) .001*
    Enrollments in Higher Education per capita (x1000) .014****
    Polity2 .0293
    Civil War .717**
    Ethnic Polarization -.258
    Pseudo r-square = .03
    *       p ≤ .10
    **     p ≤ .05
    ***    p ≤ .01
    ****  p ≤ .001